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Kim, Jongheuk (Ph.D., Economics)
Essays on Optimal Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy for Developing Economies
Thesis directed by Prof. Ufuk Devrim Demirel
This dissertation studies issues on the macroeconomic stabilization policies in emerging mar-
ket or developing countries. Specifically, I investigate an impact of the macroeconomic policy
regimes and other factors on the fluctuations of business cycles. I investigate issues concerning the
procyclical trend of fiscal and monetary policies in a closed economy under imperfectly developed
infrastructure, a small open economy case of central banking problem with a restricted financial
market accessibility and labor market distortions, and an impact of governmental wage support on
consequences of negative external shock. One of the main goal of this dissertation is to investigate
how a macroeconomic policy can optimally stabilize the economic volatility and how it can improve
a social welfare gain.
In the first chapter, I build a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model, and solve a Ramsey policy problem by using a linear-quadratic (LQ) welfare loss function to
investigate the optimal monetary policy in developing economies. To capture realistic sides of the
region, I add two frictions in the model: An imperfect financial market integration captured by a
quadratic financial adjustment cost in a budget constraint of a representative domestic household,
and a labor market friction captured by a quadratic labor adjustment cost in a production pro-
cess of a monopolistic competitive domestic firm. While the financial market friction exacerbates
the trade-off between output gap and domestic inflation stabilization faced by policy makers and
creates higher level of economic volatility, the labor market friction softens the negative effect of
the imperfectly integrated financial market by mitigating the trade-off. I also evaluate alternative
monetary policy candidates, and find that a policy emphasizing the domestic inflation stabilization
yields higher welfare cost than a policy weighing on the output gap stabilization.
A Rich volume of literature points out that many developing countries have experienced procyclical
iv
macroeconomic policies in recent period while most developed countries have not, but the reason
of the phenomenon is still in debate. In the second chapter, I theoretically investigate an optimal
fiscal and monetary policy in an economy where an institutional cost associated with public goods
influences on economic dynamics and cyclicality of macroeconomic stabilization policies. Based on
a simple New Keynesian DSGE model, a real quadratic adjustment cost that is created by a govern-
ment spending spread between current and efficient level of the public expenditures is invited. This
cost captures a negative effect of the newly created institutional cost on trade-off between inflation
gap and output gap stabilization encountered by policy authority. As a result, solving Ramsey
policy problem with a linear-quadratic welfare loss function, I find that the optimal fiscal and
monetary policy tend to be more procyclical and the economy experiences higher level of volatility
in the presence of the institutional cost. Comparing alternative monetary policy regimes based
on Taylor rule, I find that a forward looking inflation rate targeting rule reduces procyclicality of
fiscal and monetary policy and yields a significant improvement in welfare gain, while aggressive
stabilization strategy on inflation gap or output gap has no economic merit.
In the last chapter, I investigate the role of real wage changes in the dynamic responses of the
optimal macroeconomic policy to the negative foreign demand shocks, where the wage structure is
partly affected by a manually operated by a government. To do this, I build a small open economy
DSGE model with a sticky price and a monopolistically competitive nontradable sector assump-
tions. If a government manually supports the domestic consumers by a binding minimum wage
which is financed by a lump sum taxation, the optimally determined the real marginal cost in the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is decreased, and thus the economy experiences less exacer-
bated trade-off between output gap and inflation stabilization faced by a policy maker. Therefore,
with the higher level of the real wage support, an economic volatility in key macroeconomic vari-
ables from the optimal Ramsey policy problem is more mitigated, and the economy accomplishes
more efficient stabilization goal.
Dedication
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Chapter 1
Labor Market Friction, Imperfect Financial Market Integration, and Optimal
Monetary Policy for Developing Economies
1.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the imperfect financial integration condition has been relaxed
for emerging markets or developing economies. Within this changed international financial mar-
ket environment, what is an optimal monetary policy for those countries that lack labor market
flexibility? According to Frankel (2011) [35], these financial markets have traditionally been less
integrated with international financial markets than those of developed countries, but the degree of
openness has increased during the last two decades. As shown in Figure 1.1, de facto and de jure
barriers to international asset markets prevented Korean domestic consumers from accessing the
world financial markets until the early 2000s, but the market has opened significantly since then.
However, as noted by Obstfeld (2012) [58], the financial openness of emerging market economies
is still low relative to that of developed countries. 1 On the other hand, the labor market in
developing countries has been more regulated, or at least, less flexible than in developed countries.
Here, relatively powerful labor unions or a high level of regulatory protection for hired workers
might have created a higher social cost for adjusting a labor demand allocation in the production
sectors. This is not a nominal rigidity problem, which generally appears in business cycle models
for developed and developing countries, but a real one, preventing a production sector from flexibly
1 Obstfeld (2012) [58] uses a metric based on the Grubel–Lloyd index to illustrate the degree of financial market
openness, measured as the ratio of gross foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. The definition of the index is GL =
1− |A−L|
A+L
, where A denotes assets and L denotes liabilities.
2choosing an optimal level for its employment demand in each period. Figure 1.1 shows the number
of labor disputes and the workdays missed as a result of these disputes in South Korea. Until 2004,
labor friction increased, but since then, the trend has reversed. The focus of this study is on the
effect of these two frictions, in developing countries, on economic business cycles and on an optimal
monetary policy. The combined effect of these two frictions has not been actively researched in
related literature, although the separate effects of the frictions on economic dynamics has been
studied quite extensively. One of difficulties hindering academic investigations is a lack of statis-
tical evidence on the interaction between these two frictions. However, theoretical modeling and
quantitative simulation analyses can help in this regard. Furthermore, there has been a lengthy
debate on the optimal monetary policy structure for developing economies, but as yet, no consensus
on a solution. Therefore, an evaluation and comparison of several monetary policy options under
a specific economic friction can provide policymakers with much needed insight.
In this study, I develop a small open economy version of the dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) model, based on the New Keynesian frameworks.2 A benchmark New Keynesian
DSGE model assumes monopolistic competition and a sticky price setting, which generate money
non-neutrality in the short run. Thus, these assumptions enable a monetary policy to be effective
on economic dynamics. The small open economy assumption introduces an international dimension
in which financial and commodity markets are opened internationally. Thus, the domestic busi-
ness cycle is linked to foreign exogenous changes, while domestic changes cannot affect the world
economy because the size of the domestic economy is assumed to be negligible. Therefore, it is
supposed that a domestic country is given world prices and output, as well as world demand for
home-produced goods. Then, I add two frictions to the benchmark model to capture a realistic
picture of the recent changes within developing economies, as described earlier. The first friction
is that of imperfect financial integration, captured by a financial adjustment cost in the budget
constraint of representative domestic households. The second is a real labor market friction, cap-
2 The benchmark model I use follows the work of Gali and Monacelli (2005) [40], Devereux et al. (2006) [31],
Demirel (2009b) [28], and Gali (2008) [39].
3tured by a quadratic labor adjustment cost in the production process of a monopolistic competitive
domestic firm. The first friction is popular in New Keynesian literature to represent an imper-
fection or a fragility in the domestic financial market environment of a small open economy. The
linear quadratic form of the financial adjustment cost is widely used in related literature, and here
I adopt the form of Demirel (2010) [29]. This quadratic form of a financial imperfection creates
interest rate differentials between home and foreign countries, and replicates the recent trends in
foreign bond holdings and goods production. This quadratic form is different to the financial cost
model used in Benigno (2009) [7] and De Paoli (2009b) [61], which emphasizes the asymmetric
asset positions of debtor and creditor countries that largely contribute to the global imbalances
problem. This study concentrates on the imperfections in developing countries to determine how
the region-specific frictions contribute to the transmission of foreign shocks to a domestic economy,
which itself cannot impact the world financial market. Therefore, it does not consider the global
imbalance issue, and assumes that the world financial market is perfectly operated. As a result,
the asymmetry in the asset positions within a small open economy are beyond the scope of this
study. The quadratic model assumes that a domestic agent can access both domestic and foreign
currency denominated asset markets, but faces an additional adjustment cost when trading foreign
dominated assets. The labor adjustment cost has been favored in related literature since Sargent
(1978) [67] introduced the quadratic form of the cost. I simplify the form used in Janko (2008)
[43], Chang et al. (2007) [21], and Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) [47] to avoid unnecessary complexity in
the calculations. The quadratic labor adjustment cost is created when the current level of labor
demand differs from a steady-state level of employment. After successfully introducing these two
frictions to the model, I derive some important equations from the linearized competitive equilib-
rium conditions to interpret the role of the frictions in the economic dynamics. Furthermore, using
an appropriate parameterization, I solve a Ramsey policy problem to find the optimal monetary
policy, and simulate an equilibrium to obtain impulse responses to various domestic and foreign
exogenous shocks. Lastly, I analyze how economic volatility is affected by the frictions, as well as
the welfare effect of each monetary policy candidate.
4There are two main results from this study. First, the effects of the financial and labor market
frictions move in opposite ways. The imperfectly integrated financial market worsens the trade-off
between the output gap and domestic inflation stabilization faced by policymakers after introducing
the foreign bond holdings differential term to the marginal cost structure of the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve. Thus, a policymaker faces a more serious trade-off in the stabilization problem. On
the other hand, labor market friction mitigates the negative effect of the financial market friction
by reducing the sensitivity of the output gap to changes in domestic inflation and partly muting
the effect of domestic productivity shocks on output gap changes. This slow-tempo labor market
reallocation effect makes the economy react more sluggishly to exogenous shocks. Hence, increasing
financial market friction creates a higher level of economic volatility, but a more sluggish labor mar-
ket reallocation reduces the instability of the economy. Therefore, the policymakers face a greater
trade-off between the output gap and domestic inflation stabilization, because the financial market
is less integrated, but this state can be ameliorated by the real labor market distortion. Intuitively,
the nominal interest rate is set by the monetary policy authority to optimally stabilize the macroe-
conomic variables, and is a weighted combination of the output gap and domestic inflation rate.
The greater trade-off between the output gap and domestic inflation, caused by the combined effect
of the two frictions, directly affects the choice of an optimal monetary policy. Thus, the optimal
policy results in a situation in which the economy must bear a higher level of economic instability.
The second result of this study is that different policy parameter values give different results in
terms of economic volatility. While a monetary policy that emphasizes domestic inflation yields a
higher social welfare cost, a policy that emphasizes output gap stabilization obtains a lower level of
welfare loss. Simulation results show that the output gap has a higher level of volatility than does
domestic inflation in this economic environment. Thus, if the monetary policymaker emphasizes
output gap stabilization, this must achieve a significant reduction in volatility and welfare losses.
Therefore, aggressive targeting of the domestic output gap is preferable to targeting domestic in-
flation.
The main contribution of this study is that it introduces real friction to the labor market in
5the DSGE model, along with nominal rigidity problems such as nominal price rigidity and financial
adjustment costs, to explain the recent trend in the business cycle of developing countries. Many
economists view developing economies as financially fragile. However, these regions also have a
high level of misallocation of labor demand or, at least, have a relatively sluggish adjustment in
employment demand, which is partly explained by strong regulation in the labor market. When
many Asian and Latin American countries were hit by the financial crisis in 1998, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) required that these countries implement several legal reformations of their
market structure as an essential prerequisite for their help. One IMF requirement was the liberal-
ization of the labor market. However, because of cultural and social resistance, this constitutional
change took longer than expected, and some have yet to change. This study shows that the misal-
location of labor demand has a notable effect on the business cycle of a developing economy, and
is related to other frictions such as imperfect international financial market accessibility. Many
believe that the imperfect financial market integration is a main cause of global imbalances, as
effectively argued by Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) [53]. In addition to the body of literature, it
is also important to note that in the special economic circumstance in which a labor market is
distorted by a real friction, as depicted in this study, the imperfectly integrated financial market
condition can change how external shocks are transmitted to the domestic economy. Therefore, a
monetary policy should react to these conditions to find an optimal policy rule.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly reviews related
literature. Here, I discuss several schools of thought on the financial market integration and labor
market frictions, not all of which were incorporated into the model in this study. Where relevant, I
explain why a theory was excluded from my model, despite its contribution to the body of literature.
The third section explains the theoretical DSGE model in detail. This section also qualitatively
analyzes the effect of the assumed frictions on the business cycle of the economy and on the decision
making of the monetary policy authority. The fourth section explains the parameter values used
in the quantitative analysis and notes the impulse responses of the system of equilibrium equations
to various types of exogenous shocks. This section also discusses the monetary policy implications.
6Finally, the fifth section concludes the paper.
1.2 Literature Review
This study is based on the New Keynesian framework for a small open economy. It assumes
monopolistic competition, which gives each firm pricing power and markup revenue, as well as
nominal price rigidity, as in the staggered price setting of Calvo (1983) [14]. For an open econ-
omy environment, the framework assumes home and foreign final goods are produced from the
monopolistic competitive firms and traded internationally. The basic structure of the model in this
study starts from the framework of Gali and Monacelli (2005) [40] and Gali (2008) [39]. 3 In the
benchmark model, the economy is represented by a relationship between domestic inflation and an
output gap, and is analyzed from a welfare implication perspective. According to the model, the
main difference between the different monetary policy regimes arises from the level of exchange
rate volatility in each. Other seminal works on a monetary policy in an open economy environ-
ment include Smets and Wouters (2002) [71] and Devereux et al. (2006) [31], which introduce
an imperfect exchange rate pass-through as a main factor that affects monetary policy decision
making. The background knowledge on the general characteristics of developing economies in a
small open economy was provided by several studies, such as Lane (2003) [50], Frankel (2011)
[36], and Frankel et al. (2011) [37]. Lane (2003) [50] argues that there exist significant structural
differences between advanced and developing economies, including financial development, foreign
currency denominated liabilities, and a time-varying external credit constraint. The study points
out that these characteristics in underdeveloped economies can lead to a procyclical macroeconomic
stabilization policy, which I consider briefly here as well.
The financial integration and openness of an emerging market economy is one of the most
important issues considered in this study. There is a rich volume of literature that has contributed
to this topic. As a theoretical approach, a branch of this literature prefers the quadratic form
3 I also relied heavily on seminal reference textbooks, such as Woodford (2003) [82], Obstefeld and Rogoff (1996)
[59], Gali (2008) [39], and Wickens (2011) [81].
7of the financial adjustment cost embodied in a household budget constraint of the maximization
problem. For example, Uribe and Yue (2006) [77], Benigno (2009) [7], and Demirel (2009b) [27]
design the adjustment cost using this method and successfully introduce an analytically tractable
way to express the increasing cost of holding of foreign assets and, thus, an imperfectly open fi-
nancial market. De Paoli (2009a) [61] makes a small adjustment to the original quadratic form for
technical reasons, and shows how different types of asset markets derive various levels of equilib-
rium conditions. Benigno (2009) [7], De Paoli (2009a) [60], and Faia (2010) [33] adopt a similar
approach to the imperfectly integrated financial market, but are slightly different. In the model
of De Paoli (2009a) [60], financial friction is defined by an intermediation cost proportional to the
level of external debt. The main difference between De Paoli (2009a) [60] and Benigno (2009) [7]
is the ownership of the intermediation cost. De Paoli (2009a) [60] assumes the cost belongs to the
foreign agent, while Benigno (2009) [7] assigns it to the home country, which means the subsequent
welfare gain becomes different. Faia (2010) [33] assumes a borrowing constraint and shows the
degree of financial openness by relaxing the level of the external constraint.
Labor market friction is an another important issue discussed in this study, and makes it
unique in terms of open economy macroeconomics literature. By combining the domestic labor
market friction with imperfect financial market integration, this study shows that a macroeco-
nomic stabilization policy should be affected by the combined effect of the two frictions. Most
prior studies have tried to use the search and matching friction model pioneered by Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) [56]. To represent a real frictional unemployment environment, some studies,
such as Faia (2009) [32] and Faia (2010) [33], try to integrate the matching friction model within
the DSGE perspective and to then solve for the welfare cost measure. Ravenna and Walsh (2011)
[63] finds that the welfare cost associated with the labor cost created by the search and match-
ing friction model is distinct from the nominal effect on the welfare measure. Walsh (2005) [79]
explains that the labor market friction can increase the output response to the monetary policy
shock while reducing an inflation response, which departs from the usual Walrasian labor mar-
ket. In this way, the integrated effect of labor market friction and financial market integration
8has drawn some notable academic findings, such as those of Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013)
[62] and Compolmi and Faia (2011) [25]. Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) [62] uses financial
friction as a volatility puzzle solver, combining a job creation cost to create a realistic volatility
contributor. Compolmi and Faia (2011) [25] focuses on the European Monetary Union and uses
the search and matching friction model to investigate the country-specific inflation dynamics in the
study area. The study argues that country-specific labor market friction can cause the idiosyncratic
trend in the business cycle. Another branch of labor market friction in the DSGE model is the
wage stickiness setting. However, while this assumption has been successful in calibrating realistic
data observations, the core characteristic of the nominal rigidity on wage level cannot fully explain
the reasonable economic logic on the question drawn in this study. This study uses a quadratic
adjustment cost of lagged labor demand in the production function. Sargent (1978) [67] introduces
the quadratic adjustment cost for the sectoral reallocation of labor demand, and Kehoe and Ruhl
(2008) [46] develops the model for the real business cycle model. The sectoral reallocation of labor
demand can be modified easily and understood as an additional cost for a production sector when
the present level of employment demand is different from that of the previous period. This type of
cost form is heavily discussed in Cooper and Willis (2003) [26], and Chang et al. (2007) [21] and
Janko (2008) [43] develop the quadratic labor adjustment cost in a dynamic general equilibrium
model approach. This real adjustment cost does not rely on the nominal aspect of labor market
frictions, such as wage stickiness, and has a clear edge in the literature on the real frictional labor
allocation problem. It also departs from the search and matching friction model, and has the ad-
vantage that it does not have to assume a degree of job opening and labor market tightness, which
are beyond the scope of the present study.
Empirical research on the economic vulnerability of developing economies helps the reliability
of the model in this study. Since this study is motivated by the changed labor market structure
in South Korea before and after the financial crisis of 1998, several preceding studies on the event
helped to build an appropriate logical background, as well as gain a deeper insight that this study
could not capture using theoretical modeling. Braggion et al. (2009) [10] provide a brief statistical
9approach to the structural breaking event of the Asian financial crisis. They suggest that the Ko-
rean labor market during the period was inefficient and that the central bank should have reacted
to the distorted market condition. However, their study only concentrates on the inappropriately
determined wage level. Chung et al. (2007) [24] build a traditional New Keynesian small open
economy model with an imperfect exchange rate pass-through in order to evaluate the monetary
policy. Even though it uses before-crisis data, its parameterization method is well defined and
helpful. Kim and Kim (2012) [48] empirically reveals the vulnerability of the Korean economy to
exogenous financial shocks using data from the recent financial crisis between 2008 and 2010. As a
result, it partly provides empirical support for this study.
1.3 Model
The theoretical analysis of the combined effect of labor market friction and imperfect finan-
cial market integration on the business cycles and monetary policy decisions begins by building a
small open economy DSGE model. Here, I follow Gali and Monacelli (2005) [40] as a benchmark
framework for the New Keynesian open economy model. However, since the baseline model assumes
a complete asset market, it cannot fully depict an imperfect financial market with a certain fric-
tion. Therefore, I adopt a quadratic financial adjustment cost to create imperfect financial market
accessibility for a domestic country. In addition I use interest rate differentials between the home
and world economies to replicate the foreign bond holdings in the small open economy, following
the work of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) [69] and Demirel (2010) [29]. In this setting, while a
foreign country (world) has no additional cost to access the foreign currency denominated bonds,
the home country pays an additional cost to hold a certain amount of foreign assets. Additionally,
I add two more assumptions for an asymmetric small open economy case. First, home and foreign
countries have different size economies. The economic impact of the home country is assumed to be
negligible compared to that of the world economy. Therefore, the home country is given the foreign
output, consumption, and prices. This assumption makes it possible to observe the response of
a domestic business cycle to exogenous foreign demand and monetary shocks. Second, domestic
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households can access both home and foreign currency denominated asset markets, but foreign
agents can only access the foreign asset market. This is because the size of the domestic financial
market is too small to be significant to the dynamics of the international financial markets. Along
with these unique assumptions, I include monopolistic competition and a sticky prices framework,
following Calvo (1983) [14] and Yun (1996) [84], to create money non-neutrality and to allow a
monetary policy to stabilize economic volatility. Furthermore, the law of one price and purchasing
power parity hold. Lastly, this model assumes a cashless economy, following Woodford (2003) [82],
because holding cash in a utility function does not offer any improvement to the real side of the
economy and, thus, becomes a useless assumption.
1.3.1 Households
Let us consider two connected economies, Home (H) and Foreign (F ) countries, which are
separately populated with a continuum of agents, and the total population is normalized to one.
Home and foreign consumers share the same form of utility function and maximize this utility
function given a country-specific budget constraint. The utility function of a representative home
agent is given by
U(Ct, Lt) ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ −
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
, (1.1)
where Ct refers to the aggregate consumption level at time t, Lt denotes the total labor supply of
the representative household at time t, β is a time discounting factor, σ ≥ 0 is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in private consumption, and ϕ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor
supply.4 Furthermore, the domestic aggregate consumption level, Ct, consists of two parts, namely
consumption for home and foreign final goods, and is defined by
Ct ≡
[
(1− α) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + α
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (1.2)
4 This elasticity is discussed in detail in Christiano et al. (2010) [22]. In their case, 1/ϕ can be interpreted as a
Frisch labor supply elasticity, which explains the substitution effect with respect to the change of wage rate, assuming
that Lt is the number of hours worked by the representative household.
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where α ∈ [0, 1] captures the degree of openness to foreign consumption by domestic households,
which inversely denotes a home bias preference, and η ≥ 1 is an index of intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign final goods. Here, CH,t is an index of domestic goods,
using the constant elasticity of substitution functional form,
CH,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
CH,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
,
where j ∈ [0, 1] denotes the variety of goods, and ε ≥ 1 represents the elasticity of substitution
among varieties. Then, CF,t is an index of foreign produced (imported) goods, defined by
CF,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
CF,t(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
.
Note that ε is common across the consumption of home and foreign goods. This is quite a strong
assumption, but since it does not weaken any part of the main argument of this study, I accept it
for the sake of simplicity. An aggregate consumption index for a foreign representative household
can be similarly defined using an asterisk:
Ct
∗ ≡
[
(α∗)
1
η (C∗H,t)
η−1
η + (1− α∗) 1η (C∗F,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (1.3)
where α∗ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of openness to goods produced in the home country, satisfying
α∗ = α, meaning both home and foreign countries have the same degree of openness to each
other. Then, C∗H,t and C
∗
F,t are defined as the amount of consumption by foreign households
for goods produced in the home and foreign countries, respectively. Next, price indexes for the
commodity markets in the home and foreign countries, based on the above preferences and aggregate
consumption indexes, are given by
Pt ≡
[
(1− α)PH,t1−η + αPF,t1−η
] 1
1−η (1.4)
and
P ∗t ≡
[
αP ∗H,t
1−η + (1− α)P ∗F,t1−η
] 1
1−η
, (1.5)
respectively. Here, Pt and P
∗
t are the home and foreign consumer price indexes (CPI) and PH,t
and PF,t are sub-indexes for the home and foreign produced goods consumed in the home country,
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respectively. Then, P ∗H,t and P
∗
F,t are interpreted as the price indexes of home and foreign produced
goods, respectively, expressed in the foreign currency. Each of the four sub-price indexes are
expressed by an aggregation, as follows:
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)
1−εdj
) 1
1−ε
, PF,t =
(∫ 1
0
PF,t(j)
1−εdj
) 1
1−ε
, (1.6)
P ∗H,t =
(∫ 1
0
P ∗H,t(j)
1−εdj
) 1
1−ε
, P ∗F,t =
(∫ 1
0
P ∗F,t(j)
1−εdj
) 1
1−ε
. (1.7)
Using the above aggregations, we can solve for the optimal allocation of demand for varieties of
goods in the home country:
CH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t; CF,t(j) =
(
PF,t(j)
PF,t
)−ε
CF,t. (1.8)
Next, the aggregate total expenditure for the home and foreign goods follow directly from (8):∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)CH,t(j)dj = PH,tCH,t;
∫ 1
0
PF,t(j)CF,t(j)dj = PF,tCF,t. (1.9)
Now, the optimal allocations of expenditure for home and foreign goods are given by:
CH,t = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct; CF,t = α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct. (1.10)
Equation (10) completes the description of optimal expenditure allocations for the intratemporal
equilibrium of home households. The optimal allocation of foreign households consumption can be
similarly derived, denoted using an asterisk.
Next, to explore the intertemporal equilibrium of a representative household, we need to
define a budget constraint for the agent. Using equation (9) and the total aggregate consump-
tion expenditure of the home agent, PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t = PtCt, the budget constraint of the
representative home household is given by
PtCt+BH,t+EtBF,t+ ≤ Rt−1BH,t−1 +EtR∗t−1BF,t−1 +WtLt+Tt+Et
ΨB
2
(BF,t−BF )2 +
∫ 1
0
Γt(j)dj,
(1.11)
where BH,t and BF,t are the home and foreign currency denominated bonds, respectively, Et denotes
the nominal exchange rate between the home and foreign currency (relative price of foreign currency
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in terms of home currency), Rt and R
∗
t are the nominal interest rates in the home and foreign
countries, respectively, Wt is a nominal wage, BF is the steady-state value of the foreign currency
denominated bonds, Tt is a lump-sum tax or transfer governed by a fiscal authority, and Γt(j)
represents the profit of firm j. Then, ΨB2 (BF,t − BF )2 is a quadratic financial adjustment cost for
the domestic household, and the cost is assumed to be a non-zero, positive value when the current
foreign bond holding is different to the steady-state value. Furthermore, ΨB is a constant parameter
value defined by the degree of the adjustment cost for international borrowing, and captures how
the domestic financial market is isolated from the world financial market. For instance, holding
the same amount in foreign bonds, the higher adjustment cost associated with ΨB means less
perfectly integrated financial markets, or that it is more difficult for the domestic households to
access the international financial market. Therefore, ΨB functions as an inverse financial integration
indicator. If ΨB approaches zero, or at the steady state, BF,t is equal to Bt, the domestic economy
is assumed to have no financial friction, and the financial markets will be perfectly integrated. This
quadratic intermediation cost function delivers an additional cost to domestic households buying
foreign assets, and creates an interest rate differential between the home and world economies.
This is a main contributor to the amount of foreign bond holdings in the home economy, as well
as to changes in the marginal cost structure uniquely built in this model. Note that this type of
cost is only associated with the home country agent, since the size of domestic financial market
is assumed to be negligible to the foreign (world) economy, based on the small open economy
assumption. The negligible size of home economy guarantees the usage of the quadratic form of
the cost, and the lack of asymmetry in asset positions between creditor and debtor can be ignored
without any significant harm to the logic. Therefore, the foreign representative household faces a
different budget constraint:
P ∗t C
∗
t +BF,t ≤ R∗tBF,t−1 +W ∗t L∗t + T ∗t +
∫ 1
0
Γ∗t (j)dj. (1.12)
While the domestic agent enjoys two different types of assets and can use international risk pooling,
the foreign agent is only able to access the foreign currency denominated bonds. This is the result
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of the assumption that captures the reality of a small open economy, in which the size of the home
financial market is negligible relative to world financial market. Thus, the world’s demand for the
home asset can be ignored.
The first-order conditions necessary for equilibrium are given by
Wt
Pt
= Lϕt C
σ
t (1.13)
W ∗t
P ∗t
= L∗ϕt C
∗σ
t (1.14)
1 = βEt
[
R∗t
(1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF ))
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ (Et+1
Et
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)]
(1.15)
1 = βEt
[
Rt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ ( Pt
Pt+1
)]
(1.16)
1 = βEt
[
R∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ ( P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)]
, (1.17)
where Et is an expectation operator at time t. Equation (13) is interpreted as a labor supply or a
real wage determination. Equation (14) is defined similarly for the foreign country. Equation (15)
is a home household’s Euler equation for the optimal choice of foreign currency denominated bonds,
corresponding to equation (17), which is a foreign agent’s Euler equation for the optimal foreign
bonds asset position. Equation (16) states a home household’s Euler equation for the optimal
level of home currency denominated bonds. Note that, from equation (15), in the limiting case in
which Ψb approaches zero, the Euler equation replicates a frictionless benchmark version. Using the
relationship between the overall price levels in the home and foreign countries, Pt = EtP ∗t , (1.17)
can be rewritten in terms of the stream of the home country price level and the nominal exchange
rate:
1 = βEt
[
R∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ (Et+1
Et
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)]
. (1.18)
1.3.2 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity, International Risk Sharing, and Terms of
Trade
In this subsection, I derive several relations from the previously determined optimal conditions
of households, as well as some international macroeconomic definitions. First, from equations (15)
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and (16), I find the relationship between two different nominal interest rates:
1 = Et
[(Et+1
Et
)(
R∗t
Rt
)
1
1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF )
]
, (1.19)
which is a modified version of an uncovered interest rate parity in a frictional case. According to
(19), the difference between home and foreign nominal interest rates is determined by the change
of the nominal exchange rate, the foreign bond holding differential, and the degree of the financial
adjustment cost. This frictional parity generates a different level of international risk premium from
that of the benchmark. More specifically, the difference between the home and foreign nominal
interest rate (Rt − R∗t ) will widen if the change in the nominal exchange rate increases or the
effect of the financial adjustment cost gets smaller. This means that the partial integration of the
financial markets can change the gap between the two interest rates.
Next, let us define the real exchange rate between the home and foreign currencies as the ratio of
the two countries’ overall price levels, in which both currencies are denominated domestically,
Qt ≡ EtP
∗
t
Pt
. (1.20)
Then combining (15) and (17) gives the relation between the consumption levels of the home and
foreign countries in terms of the real exchange rates and the financial adjustment cost for foreign
bond holdings:
1 = Et
[(Qt+1
Qt
)(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ (Ct+1
C∗t+1
)−σ 1
1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF )
]
. (1.21)
According to (21), the adjustment cost for holding foreign assets becomes a factor that partly
determines the difference between the changes in consumption of the home and foreign countries.
This means that, if BF,t > BF , the positive effect of ΨB on the difference in foreign bond holdings
differential widens the gap between home and foreign consumption. As one of the internationally
linked markets becomes more separated, the co-movement of the consumption in both countries
would weaken.
Terms of trade is defined as the ratio of the price of imported goods to that of home-produced
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goods,
St = PF,t
PH,t
. (1.22)
In a special case where η is close to unity, the following relation holds:
Pt = P
(1−α)
H,t · PαF,t
= PH,t · Sαt . (1.23)
Furthermore, defining an inflation rate from term t to t+ 1 by Πt ≡ Pt+1
Pt
, the following equation
holds:
Πt = ΠH,t ·∆Sαt , (1.24)
where ∆Xt ≡ Xt
Xt−1
, for any arbitrary variable, X. Assuming the law of one price, PF,t = EtP ∗t ,
holds, and combining (20) and (22), one can find the relation between the real exchange rate and
the terms of trade:
Qt = S(1−α)t . (1.25)
Therefore, the international risk-sharing condition (21) can be reorganized in terms of the terms of
trade:
1 = Et
[(St+1
St
)(1−α)(C∗t
Ct
)−σ (Ct+1
C∗t+1
)−σ 1
1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF )
]
= Et
[
(∆St+1)(1−α)
(
∆Ct+1
∆C∗t+1
)−σ 1
1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF )
]
. (1.26)
According to (26), intertemporal consumption smoothing differences across the two countries can
be determined by the change in terms of trade, the commodity market openness, and the level of
home country-specific financial adjustment cost. Specifically, the gap between the current amount
of foreign bond holdings and the steady-state level of the bond holdings changes the positive effect
of the terms of trade on the international consumption spread differences. For instance, as the
financial gap increases (increasing (BF,t −BF ) and the value is positive) or the degree of financial
inaccessibility worsens (increasing ΨB), the positive effect of the increasing ∆St+1 on the level of
gap between ∆Ct+1 and ∆C
∗
t+1 is alleviated.
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Lastly, for the convenience of later analysis, (19) can be rewritten in terms of the real exchange
rate or the terms of trade:
1 = Et
[(Et+1
Et
)(
R∗t
Rt
)
1
1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF )
]
= Et
[(Qt+1
Qt
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)(
R∗t
Rt
)
1
1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF )
]
= Et
[
(∆St+1)(1−α) (Πt+1)−1
(
R∗t
Rt
)
1
1 + ΨB(BF,t −BF )
]
. (1.27)
The second equality uses the law of one price and the additional assumption that the foreign overall
price, P ∗t , is normalized to 1. The third equality follows directly from (25).
1.3.3 Producers
In the production sector of the home economy, many monopolistically competitive firms, in-
dexed by j, produce a slightly differentiated good using labor. A typical firm faces an identical
form of a linear quadratic labor adjustment cost when the current labor demand is different from
the labor employed at the steady state. This type of cost can possibly create a negative effect on
the real output level of each firm by increasing a marginal cost. As a result, the individual output
level and aggregate level of national output can be less than the frictionless benchmark economy
levels. In addition, the Calvo (1983) [14] staggered price setting is included. Therefore, the current
price level is permanently affected by the stream of past price levels.
A typical home country firm uses labor to produce a differentiated final good with a linear tech-
nology.
Yt(j) = AtNt(j), (1.28)
where Yt(j) is the output level of firm j, At is the exogenous total factor productivity following an
AR(1) stochastic process, and Nt(j) is the labor demand of firm j. In addition, following Kydland
and Prescott (1991) [49], Mendoza (1991) [52], and Janko (2008) [43], each firm faces the general
form of a quadratic labor adjustment cost if it experiences a difference between the current and
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steady-state level of labor demand:
Pt
ΨN
2
(
Nt(j)
N
− 1
)2
Nt(j),
where ΨN is a constant parameter value that captures the degree of labor market friction and N(j)
is the steady-state value of Nt. It is clear that as ΨN reaches zero, the production function replicates
the benchmark production process of Gali and Monacelli (2005) [40]. A cost minimization problem
of a typical firm, (j), in the home country is
MinNtWtNt(j) + Pt
ΨN
2
(
Nt(j)
N(j)
− 1
)2
Nt(j), (1.29)
subject to (28). Hereafter, the firm index j can be dropped in this minimization problem, be-
cause every firm faces the same technology and cost structure and faces the same problem. The
Lagrangian function is formulated as follows:
Lt = WtNt + PtΨN
2
(
Nt
N
− 1
)2
Nt + λt (Yt −AtNt) ,
where the Lagrangian multiplier, λt, is a shadow price, the nominal marginal cost for producing
one unit of finalized good at time t. The first-order condition is given by
λt =
1
At
[
Wt + PtΨN
(
1−N
N
)
Nt + Pt
Ψn
2
(
Nt
N
− 1
)2]
. (1.30)
Note that as ΨN converges to zero, the nominal marginal cost also converges to the baseline model’s
typical marginal cost, WtAt . Rewriting the above equation and dividing it by Pt, we obtain the real
marginal cost condition from the supply side:
MCt =
1
At
[
Wt
Pt
+ ΨN
(
1−N
N
)
Nt +
ΨN
2
(
Nt
N
− 1
)2]
, (1.31)
where MCt ≡ λt
Pt
is defined by the real marginal cost at time t. According to the above condition,
if N is always less than one, which will be discussed in detail in the calibration section, the real
marginal cost is permanently higher than the baseline case of the marginal cost. This means
that the marginal cost is positively affected by the demand for labor and the constant (positive)
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parameter value ΨN .
Next, following Calvo (1983) [14] and Yun (1996) [84], the model assumes a staggered price setting.
A randomly selected portion of producers, (1 − θ), set a new price level at each period, while the
remaining firms, θ, keep their price level as it was in the previous period. Therefore, θ captures the
degree of price rigidity. Let PH,t(j) be the optimal price set by firm j at time t. With the staggered
price setting described above, PH,t+k(j) = PH,t(j). Then, the problem faced by a typical firm, j, is
given by
MaxPH,tEt
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+k{Yt,t+k
(
PH,t − λt+k
)}] ,
subject to the international demand constraints
Yt,t+k(j) ≤
(
PH,t
PH,t+k
)−ε (
CH,t+k + C
∗
H,t+k
)
≡ Y dt+k(PH,t),
where Λt,t+k ≡ βk
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ (
Pt
Pt+l
)
and λt+k denotes the nominal marginal cost at period t+k with
respect to the staggered price setting, PH,t, and is determined by the previously derived real wage
equation. Note that firm specific index j can be dropped in this problem as well, because all firms
use the same price setting, subject to the same marginal cost and the same resource constraint.
Furthermore, note that this problem is identical to the price setting of Gali and Monacelli (2005)
[40], with the exception of the nominal marginal cost structure. The first-order condition yields
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
Λt,t+kYt,t+k
(
PH,t − ε
ε− 1λt+k
)]
= 0. (1.32)
Note that in the perfect flexible price setting, θ = 0, the above equation reproduces PH,t =
ε
ε−1λt.
This can be rearranged using stationary variables, as follows:
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kEt
[
Ct+k
−σYt,t+k
PH,t
Pt+k
(
PH,t
PH,t−1
− ε
ε− 1
PH,t+k
PH,t−1
MCt+k
)]
= 0, (1.33)
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where MCt+k is the real marginal cost at time t+k, as shown above, and is equal to
λt+k
PH,t+k
. We can
now define the new price index of domestically produced goods under the staggered price setting,
PH,t =
[
θPH,t−11−ε + (1− θ)(PH,t)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (1.34)
↔ PH,t
PH,t−1
=
[
θ + (1− θ)
(
PH,t
PH,t−1
)1−ε] 11−ε
. (1.35)
1.3.4 Monetary Authority
A fiscal authority organizes a lump-sum tax or transfer. A monetary authority sets the level
of the nominal interest rate, following a form of the traditional Taylor rule. The nominal interest
rate rule is given by
Rt =
(
PH,t
Pt−1
)µpi (Yt
Y¯
)µy
(R¯)(Zt)
= (ΠH,t)
µpi
(
Yt
Y¯
)µy
(R¯)(Zt), (1.36)
where µpi and µy are policy parameters, weighted by domestic inflation and output changes, respec-
tively. Then, Y¯ and R¯ are the output and nominal interest rate steady-state values, respectively,
and Zt is an exogenous monetary policy shock, which follows an AR(1) stochastic process.
1.3.5 Aggregations, Market Clearing Conditions, and Competitive Equilibrium
The aggregate level of output in the home country is
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, (1.37)
and the economy-wide employment is determined by
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj. (1.38)
The labor market clearing condition is
Lt = Nt. (1.39)
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Therefore, the aggregate output level is determined by (38) and (39) and is also linear:
Yt = AtNt. (1.40)
The market clearing condition for each differentiated home final good, j, is given by
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) + C
∗
H,t(j). (1.41)
The world market clearing condition is given by
Y ∗t = C
∗
t . (1.42)
The world output follows an AR(1) stochastic process. Therefore, it is exogenously given to the
home country agents since the demand for world output from the home economy is assumed to be
negligible in this small open economy setting. The home currency denominated bond market is
cleared, such that
BH,t = 0, (1.43)
and the world bond market is automatically cleared according to Walras’ law.
The home-produced goods market clearing condition (41) can be rewritten as
Yt(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t +
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
C∗H,t
=
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
(1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct +
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
(α)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t
=
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε [
(1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t
]
. (1.44)
The aggregate supply and demand for home-produced final goods are then calculated by substitut-
ing (44) into (37),
Yt = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
C∗t
= (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct + α
(
PH,t
PtQt
)−η
C∗t
=
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
[(1− α)Ct + α (Qt)η C∗t ] . (1.45)
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The law of one price and the definition of the real exchange rate are used in the second step of
the above calculation. The above national account states that the overall supply of the domestic
output should be equal to the demand from both home and foreign consumers, which depend on
the commodity market openness and the price levels of the home country. Furthermore, for the
convenience of later discussion, (45) can be rewritten in terms of price levels, private consumption,
exogenous foreign demand, and terms of trade:
Yt = (St)
−ηα
[
(1− α)Ct + α (St)η(1−α)C∗t
]
. (1.46)
Note that as α converges to zero, which means the home economy becomes an autarky condition,
(45) and (46) converge to the benchmark commodity market clearing condition, Yt = Ct.
Four exogenous variables are defined here:
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + 2A (1.47)
logZt = ρZ logZt−1 + 2Z (1.48)
log Y ∗t = ρY log Y
∗
t−1 + 
2
Y (1.49)
logR∗t = ρA logR
∗
t−1 + 
2
R. (1.50)
A competitive equilibrium is defined by a stream of endogenous variables, {Ct, Yt, Lt, Nt, BF,t, Rt, WtPt ,MCt,Πt,ΠH,t}∞t=0,
with four exogenous variables, {At, Zt, Y ∗t , R∗t , C∗t }∞t=1, that solve (13), (15), (24), (26), (27), (31),
(35), (36), (39), (40), (42), (46), and (47) to (50).
1.4 Policy Problem
In this section, I formalize and solve for the Ramsey policy problem to find an optimal
monetary policy under the frictions described in the previous section. To do so, I first list the
system of log-linearized equations that consist of the optimal allocation equilibrium. Then, I use
the system to derive the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) and the IS relation in this version
of this economy. I also build a simple linear quadratic social welfare loss function as an objective
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function for the policy problem. The Ramsey policy problem is then defined by solving the welfare
cost function, subject to the NKPC and IS relation.
1.4.1 Linearized System of Equations
To make the problem feasible, the first-order conditions for the optimal allocation equilibrium
described in the previous section are log-linearized. The log-linearized equilibrium consists of
endogenous variables {
(
w
p
)
, nt, ct, yt, bF,t, st, pit, piH,t, rt,mct}, and exogenous stochastic processes
{at, zt, y∗t , c∗t , r∗t } that solve(
w
p
)
= ϕnt − σct (1.51)
0 = (1− α)Et [st+1 − st]− σEt [ct+1 − ct] + σEt
[
c∗t+1 − c∗t
]−BFΨBbF,t (1.52)
0 = (1− α)Et [st+1 − st]− Et [pit+1] + r∗t − rt +BFΨBbF,t (1.53)
0 = (rt − Et [pit+1])− σEt [ct+1 − ct] (1.54)
pit = piH,t + αEt(st+1 − st) (1.55)
yt =
ωc
ωc + ωc∗
ct +
(
(1− α)ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
− α
)
st +
ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
c∗t (1.56)
mct = −at + γw
(
w
p
)
+ γnnt (1.57)
piH,t = βEt [piH,t+1] + κm̂ct (1.58)
yt = at + nt (1.59)
r̂t = µpipiH,t + µyŷt + zt (1.60)
y∗t = c
∗
t , (1.61)
where xt ' Xt−XX , for any arbitrary variable, ωc ≡ (1−α)C, ωc∗ ≡ αηSη(1−α)C∗, γw =
(W
P
)
(W
P
)+ΨN (1−N) ,
γn =
2ΨN (1−N)
(W
P
)+ΨN (1−N) , κ =
(1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ , m̂ct = mct −mc, mc = − εε−1 ≡ −µ, and r̂t and ŷt will be
defined later. Equations (51) to (56) make up the first block of the equilibrium, which is deter-
mined from the demand side of the economy. Equation (51) follows directly from (13), the real
wage determination equation for domestic households. Equation (52) is a log-linearization result of
(26), which represents the international risk-sharing condition. Equation (53) relates the interest
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rates of the two economies, derived from (27), and (54) is a simple domestic Euler equation, from
(16). Equation (55) is derived from (24), which explains the relationship between CPI inflation,
domestic inflation, and the terms of trade of the home country. Equation (56) represents the market
clearing condition for the domestic final goods, which is a log-linearized form of (46). Equations
(57) and (58) make up the supply block of the economy. The real marginal cost of the economy
is determined from (31), and is log-linearized to (57). Equation (58) is derived from the typical
domestic firm’s price decision problem, following the staggered price setting of Calvo (1983) [14]
and Yun (1996) [84], which is represented in (34) and (35). Equations (57) and (58) determine a
modified version of the NKPC of the home economy, which will be derived in the next subsection.
Equation (59) is obtained from the aggregate supply equation, (40), and (60) is a log-linearized
version of the simple nominal interest rate decision rule set by the monetary authority, defined in
(36). Finally, (61) is a market clearing condition for the world commodity market, which is defined
by an exogenous stochastic process.
1.4.2 Open Economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve and IS Relation under Fric-
tions
The marginal cost in (57) can be rewritten in terms of the output, yt, foreign bond holdings,
bF,t, and the exogenous part of the economy, at and y
∗
t , using (51), (52), (56), (59), and (61):
mct = −at + γw
(
w
p
)
+ γnnt
= (ϕγw + γn)yt − σγwct − (1 + ϕγw + γn)at
= (ϕγw + γn)yt − (1− α)γwst + γwΨBBF bF,t − σγwy∗t − (1 + ϕγw + γn)at
= Θyyt + ΘbbF,t −Θy∗y∗t −Θaat, (1.62)
where Θs =
(1−α)ωc
σ(ωc+ωc∗ )
+ (1−α)ωc∗ωc+ωc∗ −α, Θy =
[
(ϕγw + γn)−Θ−1s (1− α)γw
]
, Θb = γwΨBBF
[
1−Θ−1s (1−α)σ ωcωc+ω∗c
]
,
Θy∗ = γw
[
σ −Θ−1s (1− α)
]
, and Θa = (1 + ϕγw + γn). Equations (51) and (59) are used in the
first step in the above calculation to eliminate the real wage and labor, and (52) is implemented
in the second step to replace the private consumption with international dimension variables, such
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as terms of trade and foreign bond holdings. The last step removes the terms of trade part by in-
serting (56) into the equation. Note that in an autarky condition, where α = 0, (62) replicates the
log-linearized version of the benchmark marginal cost equation, removing the international part,
including bF,t and yt∗ . Therefore, to see the extreme case of the model, the autarky version of the
marginal cost is reduced to
mct = [(ϕ− σ)γw + γn] yt − (1 + ϕγwγn)at.
The complete form of the NKPC in this economy is as follows:
piH,t = βEt [piH,t+1] + κ
[
Θyŷt + Θbb̂F,t −Θy∗y∗t −Θaat
]
, (1.63)
where ŷt = yt − yn and ynt is the natural rate of output derived from the condition mcnt = −µ,
which is specified as
ynt = −Θ−1y µ−
Θb
Θy
bnF,t +
Θy∗
Θy
y∗t +
Θa
Θy
at,
and b̂F,t = bF,t−bnF,t, where bnF,t is the natural rate of foreign bond holdings, which is assumed to be
zero. According to the above NKPC, the signs of Θy, Θb, Θy∗ , and Θa all depend on ΨN , as well
as the steady-state values of C, S, and C∗. Therefore, it is difficult to find the sole effect of ΨN
on the parameters, but it is obvious that the parameters are affected by ΨN to some extent. Thus,
ΨN can be a main factor changing the trade-off between the output gap stabilization and inflation
stabilization problems faced by monetary policymakers. Its effect on the trade-off between output
stabilization and inflation stabilization may be mitigated by the opposite effect of the imperfect
financial market integration effect, ΨB. To clarify the effect of ΨB on the international part
of the curve, Θy∗ and Θb, we need to observe the sign of the effect of the financial adjustment
cost for holding foreign currency denominated bonds, determined by
[
1−Θ−1s (1−α)σ ωcωc+ω∗c
]
. If[
1−Θ−1s (1−α)σ ωcωc+ω∗c
]
is positive, ΨB moves the economy in the opposite direction, which means
that ΨB worsens the relationship between inflation and the output level if ΨN has a positive
effect on economic volatility. Therefore, ΨB also partly determines the level of the transmission
mechanism of foreign shocks to the domestic business cycles. Moreover, the partially integrated
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financial market assumption, represented by ΨB, can possibly move the economy in the opposite
direction to ΨN if Θb has the same sign as Θy∗ . Thus, it also changes the slope of the curve.
The open economy version of the IS relation is derived from (52), (54), and (56):
ŷt = Etŷt+1 + Σy∗Et(y
∗
t+1 − y∗t ) + Σbb̂F,t − σαEt(r̂t − piH,t+1), (1.64)
where Σy∗ =
(
1−α
σΘs
)−1 [(
σΘs−(1−α)
σΘs
)
+ α1−2α
]
, Σb =
1
σ
(
1−α
σΘs
)−1
BFΨB
[
α+ 1 + Θ−1s
(1−α)
σ
ωc
ωc+ωc∗
]
,
and σα =
1
σ
(
1−α
σΘs
)−1 (
1−3α
1−2α
)
. Note that as α goes to zero, creating the autarky commodity market
condition, both Σy∗ and Σb go to zero, σα replicates
1
σ , the closed-economy version parameter, and
the IS relation is reduced to that of the benchmark. It is straightforward to see that both Σy∗
and Σb are positive values. Therefore, they positively influence the sensitivity of the output to
the domestic interest rate changes. In this IS relation, as in the case of the NKPC, ΨN and ΨB
participate in determining the value of those parameters.
1.4.3 Linear Quadratic Welfare Measure
Following Benigno and Woodford (2006) [8] and De Paoli (2009b) [61], I build a linear-
quadratic (LQ) social welfare loss measurement. This welfare loss function has two advantages.
First, the LQ form provides a tractable way of calculation by guaranteeing the existence of a
local maximum, if parameters are appropriately defined. Second, it gives an easy way to compare
alternative policy regimes. The social welfare loss function is derived by
W = −1
2
[ ε
κ
pi2H,t + Ωyŷ
2 + Ωbb̂F,t
2 − 2Ωy,bŷtb̂F,t + 2Ωy,y∗ ŷty∗t − 2Ωb,y∗ b̂F,ty∗t
]
+O(‖ ξ ‖3) + t.i.p.,
(1.65)
where O(‖ ξ ‖3) denotes terms with order higher than three in the bound ‖ ξ ‖ on the magnitude
of the relevant shocks, and t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy variables. A detailed
derivation process is given in the appendix. According to (65), unlike the benchmark model in
a complete market economy such as Gali and Monacelli (2005) [40], the foreign bond holdings
affect the welfare level of the society. Moreover, the degree of financial market openness, ΨB, is
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directly included in Ξb, which is part of Ωb, and positively affects the value of those two parameters.
Therefore, ΨB worsens the effect on the welfare loss function. On the other hand, although the
degree of labor market friction, ΨN , is not directly included in (65), it still has an effect on the
value of the welfare function by affecting the steady-state level of key variables.
1.4.4 Ramsey Policy Problem
The Ramsey policy problem is defined by maximizing (65) subject to (60), (63), and (64). The
linear quadratic approximate solution is defined by the set {ŷt, piH,t, b̂F,t, r̂t}∞t=0. The Lagrangian
equation for the policy problem is given by
Lt = Σ∞t=0βt[W+ χ1,t [µpipiH,t + µyŷt + zt − r̂t]
+ χ2,t
[
βEt [piH,t+1] + κ
(
Θyŷt + Θbb̂F,t −Θy∗y∗t −Θaat
)
− piH,t
]
+ χ3,t
[
Etŷt+1 + Σy∗Et(y
∗
t+1 − y∗t ) + Σbb̂F,t − σαEt(r̂t − piH,t+1)− ŷt
]
],
(1.66)
where χ1,t, χ2,t, and χ3,t are the shadow prices of the interest rule decision equation, NKPC, and
IS relation, respectively. The first-order conditions for the policy problem are as follows:
−Ωyŷt + Ωy,bb̂F,t − Ωy,y∗y∗t + χ1,tµy + χ2,tκΘy − χ3,t + βχ3,t+1 = 0
− ε
κ
piH,t + χ1,tµpi − χ2,t + βχ2,t+1 + χ3,tσα = 0
Ωy,bŷt − Ωb,y∗y∗t − Ωbb̂F,t + χ2,tκΘy + χ3,tΣb = 0
χ1,t + σαχ3,t = 0.
The above system of equations are combined with (60), (63), and (65) to find the optimal level of
output gap, ŷt, domestic inflation rate, piH,t, foreign bond holdings, b̂F,t, and nominal interest rate,
r̂t.
1.5 Simulation
In this section, I quantitatively study the model to verify the effect of the two idiosyncratic
frictions on the economic dynamics and the optimal monetary policy problem. Furthermore, I
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change the monetary policy parameters and observe the changes in the equilibrium to find the
optimal weights for domestic inflation and output gap stabilization. As many recent works on the
monetary policy of emerging market economies argue, the output gap targeting rule is an interesting
topic in central banking literature. This issue motivates the second part of this section. To start
with, I adopt established parameter values from several notable studies on economic volatility
in emerging markets in the New Keynesian fashion. After that, in a simulation using the Dynare
software, I obtain impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables in equilibrium to three types of
exogenous stochastic processes: a domestic productivity shock, a domestic monetary policy shock,
and a foreign demand shock. Note that the previously defined foreign interest rate shock, r∗t , can
be written in terms of a foreign demand shock, y∗t , after some straightforward calculations:
r∗t = σ(y
∗
t+1 − y∗t ). (1.67)
Therefore, to domestic agents, a foreign interest rate shock can be understood as a weighted for-
eign demand shock differential. According to the results, while the higher level of financial market
friction creates more volatility in the economy in all three responses to the exogenous shocks, the
higher labor market friction moves in the opposite direction, thus reducing the economic volatil-
ity. Furthermore, if a monetary policy authority targets domestic inflation more aggressively, the
economy loses more welfare than when targeting the output gap or the benchmark target.
1.5.1 Parameterization
Table 1.1 shows the parameter values used in the simulation. The parameter values that
affect the steady-state level of the economy are assigned to those commonly used in small open
economy literature. The inverse elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, is set to unity, and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution between private consumption, σ, is set to two, following Demirel (2010)
[29]. I adopt the international dimension of parameters from Gali and Monacelli (2005) [40]. The
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign final goods is set to two and the
degree of openness to foreign commodity markets is set to 0.4. The time discounting factor and
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the intertemporal elasticity of substitution among final goods are assumed to be identical across
countries, and are set to 0.99 and 11, respectively. The degree of price stickiness is supposed to be
0.7, and should be around 0.66 according to many recent New Keynesian works, such as Woodford
(2010) [83]. The degree of labor market friction, ΨN , is set to 0.98, as in Janko (2008) [43], and the
financial friction measurement parameter, ΨB, is set to 0.00042, following Uribe and Yue (2006)
[77]. All steady-state values are calculated analytically, and I adopt the benchmark numbers for
monetary policy parameters that determine the weights on inflation and output gap targeting, µpi
and µy, from Gali (2008) [39]. There are three types of exogenous shocks in this section. For the
set of stochastic process parameter values that do not affect the steady-state levels in the model,
{ρA, ρZ , ρY , A, Z , Y }, I adopt values such that the model replicates key macroeconomic features
of the Korean economy represented in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) [57]. The standard deviation
of the output and interest rate, and the ratio of these two second moments are targeted. The
stochastic process parameters for the domestic productivity shock follow the values of Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) [57], the parameters for the domestic monetary policy shock are set similar to
Smets and Wouters (2002) [71], and the parameter values for the foreign demand shock is set
similar to Gali and Monacelli (2005) [40]. As shown in Table 1.2, the model fails to replicate
the actual standard deviations of the output gap and interest rate of the Korean economy, but
is relatively more successful in replicating the ratio of the two second moments. The theoretical
simulated moments are about ten times higher than the real moments, but the ratio of the output
gap to interest rate is within a reasonable distance of the actual ratio.
1.5.2 The Effect of Frictions on the Economic Volatility
Table 1.3 shows the theoretical moments of key macroeconomic variables with different levels
of the two frictions. The table compares the baseline model to the case with higher ΨB or ΨN ,
and shows the changes in social welfare loss in each case. Therefore, the changes in standard
deviation or variance explain how those two parameters affect the overall economic volatility and
social welfare cost. The table indicates that a higher level of financial adjustment cost creates
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higher volatility, and therefore, the economy with the higher level of financial adjustment cost
has the higher level of welfare loss. The logic behind the negative effect of the partial financial
separation can be shown first in the real marginal cost structure in equation (62). The permanent
increase in ΨB amplifies the value of Θb, the coefficient of b̂F,t. This permanent change steepens the
slope of the NKPC, and thus exacerbates the trade-off between domestic inflation stabilization and
output gap stabilization. This requires that the policymaker sacrifice more to obtain the same level
of stabilization as before. Another source of the effect can be found in (65), the LQ welfare loss
function. Since ΨB permanently increases the value of Ξb, and participates in many parts of the
loss function as well, the welfare cost is directly affected by the change of the parameter and, thus,
the cost changes significantly. On the other hand, the higher level of the labor market adjustment
cost softens the volatility of the economy and, thus, the economy achieves a lower level of welfare
cost. Intuitively, this negative effect of higher financial separation on economic volatility can be
understood as the result of imperfect international risk sharing and consumption smoothing that
mitigate the potential benefit of financial openness and exaggerate the social cost that the economy
must bear. The effect of ΨN is not explicitly shown in either the NKPC or the welfare loss function,
and thus it is difficult to separate its effect from the effect of the change in steady-state values, which
are combined with ΨN in all parameters for these two curves. However, from the simulation result,
it appears that the parameters in the NKPC, such as Θy or Θa, with higher levels of ΨN , move
opposite to Θb. Thus, ΨN mitigates the effect of ΨB on the business cycle stability. For instance,
ΨN can reduce the absolute value of Θa, reducing the overall effect of the domestic productivity
shock on the economy, while ΨB cannot participate in the change to Θa, since it is only involved
in Θb. Intuitively, the labor market allocation friction makes the economy react more sluggishly,
and thus the exogenous shocks becomes less effective under this condition. Figure 1.2 shows the
change in variances of the three key variables as the level of ΨB and ΨN gradually increase. The
three variances increase as ΨB goes up, but decrease as ΨN goes down. Even though we cannot
accurately determine the change in the two parameters and the absolute value of the change does
not have a significant meaning, it is still clear how the change in the two parameter values affects
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the volatility of the economy. In summary, while imperfect financial market integration negatively
affects economic volatility, the real labor market adjustment cost mitigates this negative effect by
moving the economy in the opposite direction.
1.5.3 Alternative Policy Regimes
In this subsection, I change the values of the two policy parameters in (60), µpi and µy, to find
the best monetary policy for the economy under the described frictional environment. The original
model is assumed to set µpi to 1.5 and µy to 0.125, following Gali (2008) [39], which takes these
values from Taylor (1993) [75]. I suppose two alternative cases: A policy emphasizing domestic
inflation targeting, which sets µpi to 3 while leaving µy unchanged, and a policy emphasizing output
gap targeting, setting µy to 0.5, leaving µpi unchanged. Table 1.4 shows the theoretical moments of
key macroeconomic variables and welfare losses of these three cases. According to the results, the
economy experiences a higher level of volatility with a higher value of µpi in its monetary policy,
but has lower levels of economic volatility with a higher value of µy. This means that a relatively
aggressive domestic inflation stabilization regime bears a higher social welfare cost with more un-
stable economics variables. However, emphasizing the output gap stabilization policy reduces the
welfare cost. While targeting inflation targeting achieves a marginal success in stabilizing domestic
inflation, targeting the output gap obtains better outcomes in every area other than domestic infla-
tion. Figures 1.3 to 1.5 show the impulse responses of key variables to the different types of shocks.
Figure 1.3 represents the responses to a positive domestic productivity shock. The aggressive out-
put gap targeting policy beats the other two regimes in terms of stabilization. A puzzling part of
the figure is the change in the nominal interest rate, which decreases even though the output gap
increases. This procyclical movement of the interest rate can be interpreted as a countercyclical
reaction of the central bank, which focuses more on the deflationary situation and the appreciated
domestic currency concern. Figure 1.4 shows the impulse responses to a domestic monetary shock.
In this contractionary situation, the output gap targeting is still the best of the three candidates.
Figure 1.5 shows the responses to a foreign demand shock. Once again, the output gap targeting
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rule is the best of the three. The interest rate again reacts countercyclically to the decreasing
output gap, but it helps in stabilizing the inflation situation and solves the depreciation problem.
1.6 Conclusion
This study investigated the effect of frictions in the labor and financial markets on economic
volatility, and determined an optimal monetary policy rule under these circumstances. The study
also tested alternative monetary policy regimes to find the better policy regime for this economy.
The labor demand differential between the current and steady-state levels is assumed to create an
additional adjustment cost in a production sector. Furthermore, the financial adjustment cost is
added to the budget constraint of the home country consumer when purchasing a foreign currency
denominated asset, and represents an additional cost when accessing foreign asset markets and
an imperfect integrated financial market. These two frictions change the structure of the real
marginal cost in the NKPC, the coefficient values in the IS relation, and the LQ welfare loss
function. They also permanently change the slope of the curves, which means that the monetary
policymaker should face a worse or softened trade-off between the domestic inflation and output
gap stabilization problem. With appropriate parameterization, the imperfectly integrated financial
market exacerbates the trade-off in the output gap and domestic inflation stabilization problem
and creates a higher level of volatility. However, labor market friction mitigates this negative
effect by reducing the level of volatility. The policy implications of these findings are that if the
labor market is not fully flexible, as in the reallocation problem in labor demand that creates
an additional adjustment cost, the economy is less vulnerable to domestic and foreign shocks in
terms of stability. However, the degree of imperfect integration in the financial market can boost
the transmission of the shocks by making the economy more sensitive. I also tested alternative
monetary policy regimes by changing policy parameters, enabling the central bank to focus its
interest rate decision on domestic inflation or the output gap. According to the results, a policy
that emphasizes domestic inflation stabilization carries a higher social welfare cost than both the
baseline model and the policy emphasizing the output gap stabilization. A relatively volatile output
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gap in these economic circumstances may induce this result. Therefore, policymakers facing these
two types of friction should consider a policy focusing on domestic output gap stabilization as being
optimal.
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Table 1.1: Baseline Parameter Values
Symbol Name Estimated Value
ϕ Reverse of Elasticity of Labor Supply 1
σ Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution in Private Consumption 2
η Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution between Home and Foreign Final Goods 2
α Degree of Openness to Foreign Commodity Market 0.4
β Time Discounting Factor 0.99
ε Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution among Final Goods 11
µ Markup Revenue 1.1
θ Degree of Price Stickiness 0.7
Y Steady State Value of Yt 0.6324
C Steady State Value of Ct 1.5608
N Steady State Value of Nt 0.6324
BF Steady State Value of BF,t 0
ΨN Degree of Labor Market Friction 0.98
ΨB Degree of Financial Market Friction 0.00042
ρA Autoregressive Parameter of Domestic Productivity Shock 0.7
ρZ Autoregressive Parameter of Domestic Monetary Policy Shock 0.9
ρY Autoregressive Parameter of Foreign Demand Shock 0.86
A Standard Deviation of Domestic Productivity Shock 0.07
Z Standard Deviation of Domestic Monetary Policy Shock 0.01
Y Standard Deviation of Domestic Foreign Demand Shock 0.007
µpi Monetary Policy Parameter for log of Inflation 1.5
µy Monetary Policy Parameter for log of Output Gap 0.125
R Policy Anchor Value of Interest Rate 1.0264
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Table 1.2: Simulated vs. Targeted Moments
Moments Simulated Value Estimated Value Distance
STD. DEV. of Output 0.4733 0.0354 0.4379
STD. DEV of Interest Rate 0.2045 0.0142 0.1903
Ratio of STD. DEV. of Output to STD. DEV. of Interest Rate 2.3144 2.4929 0.1785
Table 1.3: Theoretical Moments: Changes in ΨB and ΨN and Contributions to Welfare Losses (HP
filter, lambda = 1600)
Benchmark ΨB = 0.00042, ΨN = 0.98 STD. DEV. VARIANCE
Output Gap (ŷt) 0.4733 0.2240
Domestic Inflation (piH,t) 0.1768 0.0312
CPI Inflation (pit) 0.8996 0.8093
Interest Rate (rt) 0.2045 0.0418
Terms of Trade (st) 12.8976 166.3469
Foreign Bonds Holding Gap (b̂F,t) 0.2064 0.8093
Welfare Loss . 18.3573
High Financial Adjustment Cost ΨB = 0.001, ΨN = 0.98 STD. DEV. VARIANCE
Output Gap (ŷt) 0.4869 0.2370
Domestic Inflation (piH,t) 0.1810 0.0328
CPI Inflation (pit) 0.9246 0.8548
Interest Rate (rt) 0.2092 0.0437
Terms of Trade (st) 13.2678 176.0343
Foreign Bonds Holding (bF,t) 0.2119 0.4490
Welfare Loss . 20.6420
High Labor Adjusment Cost ψB = 0.00042, ψN = 1.5 STD. DEV. VARIANCE
Output Gap (ŷt) 0.4289 0.1840
Domestic Inflation (piH,t) 0.1607 0.0258
CPI Inflation (pit) 0.8187 0.6703
Interest Rate (rt) 0.1860 0.0346
Terms of Trade (st) 11.7370 137.7572
Foreign Bonds Holding (bF,t) 0.1885 0.0356
Welfare Loss . 16.4562
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Table 1.4: Theoretical Moments: Alternative Policy Regimes and Contributions to Welfare Losses
(HP filter, lambda = 1600)
Benchmark (OPT) µpi = 1.5, µy = 0.125 STD. DEV. VARIANCE
Output Gap (ŷt) 0.4733 0.2240
Domestic Inflation (piH,t) 0.1768 0.0312
CPI Inflation (pit) 0.8996 0.8093
Interest Rate (rt) 0.2045 0.0418
Terms of Trade (st) 12.8976 166.3469
Foreign Bonds Holding Gap (b̂F,t) 0.2064 0.8093
Welfare Loss . 18.3573
Emphasis on Domestic Inflation Targeting (DIT) µpi = 3, µy = 0.125 STD. DEV. VARIANCE
Output Gap (ŷt) 0.7412 0.5493
Domestic Inflation (piH,t) 0.1678 0.0282
CPI Inflation (pit) 1.2849 1.6511
Interest Rate (rt) 0.4089 0.1672
Terms of Trade (st) 19.9097 396.3976
Foreign Bonds Holding (bF,t) 0.3490 0.1218
Welfare Loss . 18.9721
Emphasis on Output Gap Targeting (OGT) µpi = 1.5, µy = 0.5 STD. DEV. VARIANCE
Output Gap (ŷt) 0.3325 0.1105
Domestic Inflation (piH,t) 0.1814 0.0329
CPI Inflation (pit) 0.6981 0.4873
Interest Rate (rt) 0.0976 0.0095
Terms of Trade (st) 9.2135 84.8878
Foreign Bonds Holding (bF,t) 0.1319 0.0174
Welfare Loss . 14.4236
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Figure 1.1: Characteristic Statistics of South Korea
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Figure 1.2: Variances of Key Variables with Changes in Labor Adjustment Cost and Financial
Adjustment Cost
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to a 1% Positive Domestic Productivity Shock: Comparisons among
Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses to a 1% Positive Domestic Monetary Policy Shock: Comparisons
among Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes
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Figure 1.5: Impulse Responses to a 1% Positive Foreign Demand Shock: Comparisons among
Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes
Chapter 2
Cyclicality of Optimal Stabilization Policy in Developing Countries under
Frictions: Role of Institutional Cost Associated with Providing Public Goods
2.1 Introduction
A recent report by Frankel (2011)[36] and Vegh and Vuletin (2012)[78] demonstrate a sharp
contrast between industrialized and developing countries in terms of cyclicality of macroeconomic
policies. Many of developing countries have experienced a significant level of procyclical fiscal
and monetary policies while most developed countries have had acyclical or countercyclical policy
regimes since 1960. There has been a rich volume of literature trying to explain this puzzling policy
issue, mostly focusing on political economy based theory or microeconomic finance assumptions.
Meanwhile, one may wonder if the sharp contrast of cyclicality of macroeconomic policy between
developed and developing countries comes from a macroeconomic fundamental difference, such as
different level of social cost associated with public goods spending. Can higher level of institutional
cost associated with providing public goods be an answer for the procyclical macroeconomic sta-
bilization policy in the fast growing countries? Can that puzzling policy trend be an optimal one?
If so, what is the best combination of fiscal and monetary policy to stabilize their business cycle
fluctuations? To answer these questions, I investigate the effect of higher institutional cost which
is caused from the public expenditure on the procyclical fiscal and monetary policy in developing
economies. I further studies to design the optimal fiscal and and monetary policy for those countries
under this certain friction. To do so, I build a simple new Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model with an assumption of a real friction, which is created from a spread
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between current and efficient levels of government spending. I then solve a Ramsey policy problem
with quadratic welfare loss function to find the optimal package of fiscal and monetary policies
under this special economic circumstance. The paper examines how the additional or higher level
of institutional cost leads to the procyclical fiscal and monetary policy trend, and that kind of
procyclicality is economically rational, which means that it is optimal policy regime under this
specific assumption.
Main finding of this paper is that the institutional cost associated public goods expenditure deepens
the level of procyclical fiscal and monetary policies, and this kind of procyclicality is economically
rational and optimal. Moreover, higher level of the effect of the institutional cost on the economy
induces the higher level of economics volatility. To be more specific, higher level of the effect of
the institutional cost amplifies the effect of exogenous shock on the economy, therefore it worsens
trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output gaps. (For example, if there is a negative tech-
nology shock, monetary policy maker should increase interest rate to stabilize the price level, while
it gives up the volatility of output due to the interest rate change.) It means that, if there is a
negative productivity shock to the economy, there should be a pressure on the inflation, and in this
situation, for a fiscal authority, since the existence of the higher cost makes a part of government
spending and output to be wasted, or to be wasteful (because with the additional cost it is more
costly to use a unit of government spending), it is required to more aggressively decrease govern-
ment spending to stabilize the economy. Another finding of the paper is that, by testing different
candidates of Taylor rule type monetary policy based on the welfare loss function criterion, forward
looking inflation targeting achieves significant welfare gain while aggressively weighting on normal
inflation targeting or output gap targeting has no economic merit. Forward looking inflation tar-
geting enhances policy maker’s ability to protect the economy from exogenous monetary policy
shock, which significantly reduces overall economic volatility.
In this closed economy model, in addition to the widely used nominal frictions in new Keynesian
model, nominal price rigidity and monopolistic competition in a production sector, I introduce a
real friction of the government spending spread which is captured from the fact that many emerging
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market or developing economies still have a difficulty in financing cheap public expenditure sources
that possibly hampers further economic growth and sustainable stabilization of business cycles.1
This main assumption is represented in the model as a type of a quadratic form of real adjustment
cost which is generated when current level of public expenditure is different from the efficient level
of the public expenditure. This real adjustment cost can be interpreted as an institutional cost
associated with the public goods spending, and thus the cost negatively affects on the trade-off
between inflation gap and output gap stabilization encountered by monetary policy authority. The
government spending is considered as a physical public expenditures which is consumed in the
form of utility function of representative households, and a degree of the effect of the government
spending spread is scaled by a specific parameter (ξ) in the model, which is a key to explain the
main findings of this paper.
The effect of overall cost for the public expenditure, combined by parameter value of the gov-
ernment spending spread and the quadratic adjustment cost itself, has an effect on the trade-off
between inflation and output gap stabilization policy problem through direct and indirect channels.
In the direct channel, the higher value of the adjustment cost steepens the slope of New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) and IS relation, and amplifies the effect of exogenous productivity shock in
these two relations. This results in a worsened trade-off in the relations that policy makers face in
their decision making process. The exacerbated trade-off forces policy makers to bear higher level
of volatility in key macroeconomic variables and related policy variables to achieve an effective level
of inflation in order to stabilize an output, or vice versa. The policy makers also should conduct
higher level of changes in the instruments to stabilize the economic fluctuations. This mechanism
mainly induces the first two findings of the paper. Additionally, in the indirect channel, the cost
from real friction changes weights on each variable in the welfare-based linear quadratic objective
function of policy makers in Ramsey problem. In the linear-quadratic form of welfare loss function,
changes in degree of the institutional cost can amplify a relative weight on policy variables that
1 Straub (2008)[72] empirically points out that there is a significant level of deficiencies of infrastructure in
many developing countries and the lack of public service is strongly linked to the discouragement of macroeconomic
development.
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includes public expenditure. With this change in relative importance of each variable in the objec-
tive function, policy makers perceive different level of effectiveness of fiscal or monetary policy on
the economic dynamics, and decides to conduct more aggressive stabilization policy tool in order
to maintain the same level of economic volatility. This structural change also contributes to the
main findings.
The main contribution of this paper is that, while it fails to provide a direct causality of procyclical
fiscal and monetary policy in developing countries, it still succeeds in proving that the institutional
cost associated with the public goods expenditure deepens the abnormal procyclical trend of the
macroeconomic policies and the policy is economically optimal. There has been a rich volume of
literature on the possible reasons for procyclicality in developing economies, but unfortunately rare
chance of global consensus has been driven. This paper suggests that, without considering political
economy dimensions such as Talvi and Vegh (2005)[73] or [3], the lack of smooth public goods
expenditure, a common feature across the most of developing countries, can endogenously worsens
the puzzling tendency of policy regimes. Furthermore, the paper argues that under that kind of
economic environment, a procyclical macroeconomic policy is logically optimal, as a possible so-
lution for the puzzling economic phenomena. Another potential contribution of this paper to the
related literature is that, the paper opens a new room for a discussion on policy implications of
business cycles with an additional cost that captures an imperfect public expenditure structure.
Public investment has been widely studied in development or growth literature as a main driver of
economic stimulation, but rarely discussed in business cycle literature. Furthermore, a research on
real frictions caused by the imperfectly supplied public goods combined with a nominal rigidity of
prices has been little ignored in the field, although the importance of the effect of the combined
friction on the economic volatility in many developing countries has been increased. Even though
the paper has a limitation of closed economy model that ignores the effect of international dimen-
sion such as an effect of exchange rate pass-through or collateral constraint of national debt, this
paper still has an edge by providing an insight on the policy implications under circumstances of
imperfectly supplied public goods that the policy authority should consider the public spending
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spread in order to achieve optimally stabilized macroeconomic variables.
2.2 Literature Review
In this section, I discuss related literature to the key features of the model in this paper. The
model mainly focuses on the effect of imperfectly supplied public goods on economic dynamics and
policy cyclicality. A real adjustment cost illustrates the gap between current and natural levels
of government spendings, which exemplifies the lack of perfectly provided public goods affecting
business cycle of the economy. Baier and Glomm (2001)[5], Rioja (1999)[64] and Rioja (2003)[65]
examine the effect of development in infrastructure on economic development in neoclassical fashion.
Especially Baier and Glomm (2001)[5], putting distortionary taxes in the model, find that the
infrastructural development can effectively stimulate the economic growth with appropriate level
of elasticity of substitutions between inputs. Azzimonti et al. (2009)[4] build a Ramsey policy
problem with alternative technical approaches, to compare welfare losses between commitment
and discretion cases when productive public capital is introduced in the model. It shows that
welfare loss under discretion relative to the commitment case is minimal. Leeper (2010)[51] build
a neoclassical model to find the delayed implementation effect of government investment on the
economics growth. The paper reveals that an unanticipated delay of public investment can possibly
discourage labor and output growth in short run.
This paper is also interested in a procyclity of macroeconomic policies. Validity of procyclical fiscal
policy has long been an important issue of debate in related literature, while many researchers have
tried to find the main determinant of the procycality on the other hand. Papers such as Kaminsky
et al. (2004)[45] and Alberola and Montero (2006)[2] empirically demonstrate the recent trend
of developing economies that have exhibited procyclicality of important macroeconomic indicators
including fiscal and monetary policies. Many papers in the literature have made an effort to
validate that kinds of procyclical economic policies with variety of theoretical approaches. Talvi
and Vegh (2005)[73] insist that even in an economic boom sustaining budget surplus is costly for
some developing countries because there is an ongoing political pressure to spend more tax revenue.
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While Ilzetzki (2011)[42] and Alesina and Tabellini (2005)[3] also focus on the political economy
side factors on the procyclicality, Tornell and Lane (1999)[76] endogenously solve the unexpectedly
increased fiscal redistributions by using the term ”voracity effect.” Inspired by recent data set,
Mendoza and Oviedo (2006)[55] point out that governments in emerging market economies behave
like a ”tormented insurer,” which means that the fiscal authority spends more money on private
sector to defend the reduction of variability of revenue as economy enjoys boom, and thus it creates
the procyclical fiscal policy regimes in those regions. Upon these findings, Demirel (2010)[29] argues
that in a small open economy model with the existence of country spread, optimal stabilization
polity is procyclical.
Methodologically this paper aims at finding a mix of optimal fiscal and monetary stabilization policy
by using Ramsey problem with linear-quadratic welfare loss function. The paper follows pioneering
works of papers such as Benigno and Woodford (2012)[9], Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)[69], and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)[70]. The papers enlighten the way of finding both optimal fiscal
and monetary policies simultaneously by implementing well-defined Ramsey problems. Especially
Benigno and Woodford (2012)[9] provide an ample theoretical background for the benefit of linear-
quadratic welfare measure. According to the paper, the functional form gives the enough possibility
of unique solution as well as easiness of comparing alternative policy regimes.
2.3 Model
Analysis on cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy regimes starts with a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model of a new Keynesian economy. Based on the benchmark features of a
closed economy new Keynesian model such as staggered price setting following Calvo (1983)[14]
and monopolistic competition in production sectors, I add a real quadratic adjustment cost in the
economy as one of the main distortions, which is defined by a government spending spread between
current and efficient level. This cost captures an institutional cost associated with public goods that
hampers efficiently utilized public spending process. The economy consists of households, firms,
and governments which complete a competitive equilibrium. A identically populated household
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consumes private and public goods and provides inelastic unit labor, firms produces differentiated
goods in monopolistic competitive fashion, fiscal authority collects lump sum tax and decides the
amount of transfers, and monetary authority sets nominal interest rate as a stabilizing policy.
2.3.1 Households
Identically populated households live infinitely and maximize the discounted expectation of
a lifetime utility function. Preferences of a representative household is defined by
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ + χG
G1−φt
1− φ − χL
Lt(i)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
(2.1)
where Ct, Gt, and Lt denote the level of composite private and public consumption and labor
supplied, respectively. Et is an expectation operator conditional on all information given at time
t. For parameters, 0 < β < 1 is time discounting factor, σ > 0 and φ > 0 stand for inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution of private and public consumption, and ϕ > 0 is a reverse of an elasticity
of labor supply. χG and χL are relative weights on public consumption and disutility of labor
supply, but I assume that they are normalized by one hereafter for convenience of calculation. The
composite private or public consumption is assumed to be a continuum of differentiated goods
produced by numerous final goods producers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and defined by
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
δ−1
δ di
) δ
δ−1
(2.2)
Gt =
(∫ 1
0
Gt(i)
δ−1
δ di
) δ
δ−1
(2.3)
where δ > 1 is an intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods. The labor
supply is aggregated by individual labors dedicated to each differentiated production sector:
Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di (2.4)
Consumption price index (CPI) is calculated by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−δdi
) 1
1−δ
(2.5)
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Furthermore, a representative household’s demand function for each differentiated private good is
calculated by
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−δ
Ct (2.6)
The budget constraint for the representative household at period t is determined by
PtCt +Bt ≤WtLt +Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt + Γt (2.7)
where Bt is nominal bond holdings printed by government, Rt is the gross interest rate set by
monetary policy authority, Wt denotes the nominal wage for unit amount of labor, Tt stands for
a lump-sum type tax or transfer from government, and γt is the the profit of firms since the firms
are assumed to be owned by households. To prevent the possibility of Ponzi scheme, the following
additional condition is needed:
lim
k→∞
Et
 k∏
j=0
Bt+k+1
Rt+j
 ≥ 0 (2.8)
The household’s problem is defined by the maximization of (2.1) with respect to Ct, Lt, and Bt,
subject to (2.7) and (2.8). The first order necessary conditions are calculated by
Wt
Pt
= Lϕt C
σ
t (2.9)
1 = βEtRt
(
Pt
Pt+1
)(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(2.10)
Equation (2.9) indicates the mechanism of labor supply or real wage determination. The real wage
is determined by weighted combination of labor supply and private consumption. Equation (2.10)
is a simple Euler equation that relates inter-temporal consumption streams to future inflation rate,
Pt+1
Pt
and nominal interest rate, Rt, which are weighted by time discounting factor, β. This also
represents that the marginal utility for the private consumption at the current period should be
equal to the discounted marginal utility of future consumption.
2.3.2 Firms
Production sector is assumed to have infinitely many firms indexed by i on the unit interval
[0, 1], and each firm produces a differentiated good in a monopolistically competitive environment.
50
The each firm has a constant return to scale technology,
Yt(i) = AtNt(i) (2.11)
where Yt(i) is an amount of output for a good i, At is an economy-wide common productivity shock
that follows AR(1) stochastic process which will be defined later, and Nt(i) is an amount of labor
demanded for production sector i. Cost minimization problem for each firm solves for a nominal
marginal cost which is denoted by MCt(i), to be a function of nominal wage and productivity
shock:
MCt(i) =
Wt
At
(2.12)
Furthermore, an aggregate level of labor demanded is a simple sum of each sector’s amount
of labor demanded:
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di (2.13)
Following Calvo (1983)[14] and Yun (1996)[84], the model introduces another imperfection of the
economy, a staggered price setting. Each firm has a probability of 0 < θ < 1 to hold its price at
any date. In other words, with the probability 1− θ, a typical firm newly updates its price at each
period. θ is then understood as a degree of price stickiness. Therefore, a single firm’s price Pt(i) is
a weighted sum of P ∗t (i), a newly set price at current period, and the price of the previous period,
Pt−1(i). A price level of each firm set at time t is then given by
Pt(i) = (1− θ)P ∗t (i) + θPt−1(i) (2.14)
At each period, a single firm i encounters a profit maximization problem with respect to
P ∗t (i),
maxP ∗t (i)
∞∑
s=0
EtΛt,t+sθ
sYt+s(i) (P
∗
t (i)−MCt+s(i)) (2.15)
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subject to
Yt+s(i) ≥
(
P ∗t (i)
Pt+s
)−δ
Yt+s (2.16)
MCt+s(i) =
Wt+s
At+s
(2.17)
Yt(i) = Ct(i) +Gt(i) (2.18)
and (2.2) and (2.3), where Λt,t+s is a stochastic discount factor defined by
Λt,t+s = β
s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)(
Ct
Ct+s
)σ
(2.19)
The first order condition of the maximization problem is reduced to
P ∗t (i) =
δ
δ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 θ
sΛt,t+s
(
̂MCt+s(i)P δ−1t+s Yt+s
)
Et
∑∞
s=0 θ
sΛt,t+s
(
P δ−1t+s Yt+s
) (2.20)
where ̂MCt+s(i) denotes a real marginal cost,
MCt+s(i)
Pt+s
. Note that as θ converges to zero, i.e.,
the price goes to the fully flexible state, the equilibrium price level also settles to the benchmark
level, Pt(i) = µ ̂MCt+s(i), where µ = δδ−1 , which can be interpreted as a markup revenue. Since
the symmetric equilibrium is assumed, all firms solve identical problems at each period, and thus
one can drop i notation hereafter, such as P ∗t (i) = P ∗t and MCt+s(i) = MCt+s. Combining CPI
definition from (2.5) and (2.14) with the above result gives the clearer version of the inflation rate:
Πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1
=
(
(1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
)1−δ
+ θ
) 1
1−δ
=
(
(1− θ)Π∗t 1−δ + θ
) 1
1−δ
(2.21)
where Π∗t is defined by
P ∗t
Pt−1 .
2.3.3 Government
There are two policy tools and they are separately operated by two independent authorities,
fiscal and monetary policy authorities. A benevolent fiscal authority provides a public expenditure,
Gt, to the private sector, collects tax following lump sum fashion, and prints one-period risk free
nominal bond, Bt, with price Rt to finance it. Gt is an aggregation of Gt(i) following (3), and thus
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the demand function for public good for any variety i is calculated by
Gt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−δ
Gt (2.22)
There exists an quadratic adjustment cost if current level of the fiscal spending is different from the
efficient level of it. Let Xnt be an efficient level of an arbitrary variable Xt at time t and it is said
to be the state where all prices are fully flexible without any market distortions. The difference,
defined by (Gt−Gnt ), is not fully cleared even when the economy reaches at the steady state level. A
steady state means all endogenous variables are stable enough so that there is almost no changes on
them, still containing one or more market imperfections if the distortions are assumed to exist at the
beginning of the economy and continue to have an effect on the economy permanently. Therefore,
there is no sound guarantee that the difference, in short term, Ĝt, will be cleared at any steady state
level. Furthermore, Ĝt
2
is a real quadratic adjustment cost departing from the traditional nominal
rigidity assumptions such as quadratic capital adjustment cost introduced by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003)[69]. And this real adjustment cost can be interpreted as the difference between the
level of government service provided at the current stage and the ”desired” level of the public
spending, i.e., the efficient level. The real friction occurs when current level of expenditure is not
met with the desired level, even including a surplus situation. A budget constraint of the fiscal
policy maker is then assumed to be balanced at every period,
PtGt +Rt−1Bt−1 = −Tt +Bt − Pt ξ
2
(Gt −Gnt )2 (2.23)
where ξ > 0 captures a degree of the effect of the adjustment cost. As ξ converges to zero,
the effect of the government spending gap on the economy becomes negligible. This means that
the economy is more independent of the real friction. Potential factors affecting the degree of
ξ is not explicitly demonstrated in this model, but some evidences of the higher level of xi in
developing countries are discussed in several papers such as Talvi and Vegh (2005)[73]. In developing
countries, because of tax evasion or political corruption, it is hard for a central government to have
a fully flexible targeting mechanism to minimize the effect of the real friction between current level
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and efficient level of fiscal spending. For instance, in a recession, since developing countries may
meet worse situation of tax evasion, they are not able to aggressively cancel the gap immediately.
Therefore, the higher level of ξ captures higher level of exogenous factors that amplify the effect of
the government spending spread. It is important to note that, the zero value of ξ does not replicate
developed countries situation. There should be further consideration and modification of the model
to correctly express a developed country version of the economy. Regardless of the value of xi, this
model represents the case of developing economies.
On the other side, a monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate, Rt, at every period. A
simple Taylor rule is implemented as a benchmark one.
Rt = R
(
Πt
Π
)γpi ( Yt
Y nt
)γy
Zt (2.24)
where γpi and γy are policy parameters, R is a steady state level real interest rate, and Zt is
an exogenous monetary policy shock which follows AR(1) stochastic process. Therefore, the two
idiosyncratic policy authorities choose {Rt, Gt, Tt}t≥0 with uniquely determined {Bt}t≥0.
Maximizing the utility function with respect to Gt subject to (2.23) gives the relation between
private and public goods consumption
G−φt
(1 + ξ(Gt −Gnt ))
= C−σt (2.25)
(2.25) says that, with the presence of ξ(Gt − Gnt )), relative price of those two consumption, or
marginal rate of substitution, is changed. If one assumes that Gt > G
n
t and ξ > 0, marginal utility
of public consumption is increased, which means that the cost of unit public spending is higher
than frictionless case.
2.3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of endogenous variables {Ct, Gt, Lt, Nt, Yt, Bt,MCt}t≥0
with prices {Πt,Π∗t , Rt,Wt}t≥0 and a package of exogenous stochastic processes {At, Zt} satisfying
(2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.12), (2.21), (2.23), (2.24), (2.25), goods market clearing condition,
Yt = Ct +Gt +
ξ
2
(Ĝt)
2 (2.26)
54
bond market clearing condition,
Bt = 0 (2.27)
labour market clearing condition,
Lt = Nt (2.28)
the aggregate production,
Yt = AtNt (2.29)
the specification of the common technology shock At which follows AR(1) process
logAt = ρ logAt−1 + εat (2.30)
and exogenous monetary policy shock Zt which also follows AR(1) process
logZt = ρ logZt−1 + εzt (2.31)
2.4 Qualitative Analysis
In this section, I discuss about economic implications of the main assumption of the model
described in the above section in detail. From the planner’s problem, I obtain log-linearized versions
of important equations that endogenously reflect the distorted effect of imperfectly developed public
infrastructure on the economic dynamics. And I also define natural rates of endogenous variables
expressed in terms of the exogenous shock and parameter values. After then, I characterize a
Ramsey policy problem to obtain an insight on the policy implications. To do so, I construct a
linear-quadratic welfare loss function following Woodford (2003)[82] and Benigno and Woodford
(2012)[9], that it easily guarantees the uniqueness of solution and it also has a benefit of capability
of comparing alternative policy regimes.
2.4.1 Procyclical Economic Policy
Price determination (2.20) can be solved forward and log-linearized that provides a so-called
new Keynesian Phillips equation:
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pit = κm̂ct + βEtpit+1 (2.32)
where κ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)θ , and m̂ct is defined by the difference between log deviation of real marginal
cost at time t from its steady state level and the log of its natural level value, log 1µ . (2.32) states that
the current level of inflation is affected by the real marginal cost, including the effect of monopolistic
competition captured by a reverse of markup revenue, and by an expectation of future inflation.
To replace m̂ct with expressions of familiar endogenous variables, I use labor supply equation (2.9),
labor market clearing condition (2.28), and (2.29) combined with the specification of the marginal
cost (2.12). After some straightforward calculations I express the real marginal cost in terms of Yt
and Ct:
M̂Ct = (Yt)
ϕ (Ct)
σ (At)
−(ϕ+1)
= Y ϕt A
−(ϕ+1)
t (Yt −Gt −
ξ
2
(Ĝt)
2) (2.33)
By log-linearizing (2.33), one can obtain expression of the log deviation of the real marginal cost
in terms of log deviations of output, yt, government spending, gt, and the stochastic process, at:
m̂ct = (ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)yt − σG
C
(1 + ξĜ)gt − (ϕ+ 1)at (2.34)
Substituting (2.34) into (2.32) with ”gap” variable expression, which is defined by the difference
between current and natural levels of variable, I provide the modified version of New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC):
pit = κ(λyŷt − λg ĝt) + βEtpit+1 − λaat (2.35)
where x̂t ≡ xt−xnt for any arbitrary endogenous variable xt, λy = (ϕ+σ YC ), λg = σGC (1+ ξĜ), and
λa = σ
G
C ξĜ
[
1
Y
(
Cφ
σ +G
)
+ φϕ
]−1
(1 + 1ϕ). y
n
t and g
n
t are derived from the social planner’s problem
in an efficient market environment:
ynt = (ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)−1
[
σ
G
C
gnt + (ϕ+ 1)at
]
(2.36)
gnt =
[
1
Y
(
Cφ
σ
+G) +
φ
ϕ
]−1
(1 +
1
ϕ
)at (2.37)
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Detailed calculation of (2.36) and (2.37) is provided in a technical appendix. Note that as ξ goes to
zero, (2.35) becomes a benchmark NKPC with government spending and without cost push shock,
since λa converges to zero. But with any value of ξ, the real adjustment cost exists and obviously
affects the inflation dynamics through cost push shock. As ξ increases, λa increases, and the trade-
off of NKPC is worsened. The other channel of the effect of ξĜ is captured in λg, the coefficient of
ĝt. As ξ goes up, the amount of λg increases, which creates a steeper slope of NKPC. This means
that the policy maker encounters larger trade-off between inflation and government spending gap
stabilization. Furthermore, the sign of λg is determined by Ĝ. λg is positive if Ĝ is positive, which
means that G > Gn, implying that the steady state level of government spending is larger than
the efficient level of the spending. This can be interpreted as a boom. In this situation, public
spending gap is negatively related with inflation. If G < Ĝ, a possible recession, λg is negative, and
the public spending gap is positively related with the inflation. In either case, the slope of NKPC
is steepened.
Monetary policy rule is determined separately. The log-linearized version of benchmark Taylor rule
(2.24) is calculated by
rt = r + γpipit + γyŷt + zt (2.38)
Looking at (2.38), the log-linearized value of interest rate should be determined by a log deviated
level of inflation gap, a log deviated output gap and an exogenous monetary policy shock.
Another important macroeconomic equation is a so called IS relation, which can be obtained by log-
linearizing the first order necessary condition of household’s problem, (2.10). Substituting economy
wide resource constraint into (2.10) to replace ct with yt and gt, and using (2.36) and (2.37) to
express the log-linearized version of (2.10) with gap variables, it is derived by
ŷt − ηg ĝt = −C
Y
1
σ
(rt − Etpit+1) + Etŷt+1 − ηgEtĝt+1 + ηg,nEt∆gnt+1 + ηa(Etat+1 − at) (2.39)
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where
ηg =
G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)
ηg,n =
(
ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)−1(
σ
G
C
(1 + ξĜ)
)
ηa =
[
G
C
(1 + ξĜ)
(
1
Y
(
Cφ
σ
+G) +
φ
ϕ
)−1(
1 +
1
ϕ
)
−
(
ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)−1
(ϕ+ 1)
]
and ∆gnt+1 = g
n
t+1 − gnt . Detailed process of derivation is provided in the technical appendix.
(2.39) indicates that all three parameters ηg, ηg,n, and ηa are affected by ξĜ in some extents. As
ξ increases, values of three parameters also increase, which induce a steeper slope of IS relation.
Especially ηa increases with the higher value of ξ, it worsens the trade-off of IS relation. This
exacerbated trade-off between variables is clearly captured the amount of ξĜ, and without ξĜ, the
IS relation obviously comes back to the benchmark case.
Committee of two economic policy authorities simultaneously choose the optimal set {pit, ŷt, ĝt, rt}t≥0
subject to (2.35), (2.38), (2.39) along with {ynt , gnt }t≥0 that are defined by (2.36) and (2.37), and the
stochastic process, (2.30) and (2.31), given {pi−1, y−1, g−1, r−1}. To solve this problem, I provide a
constructed Ramsey policy problem in the next subsections.
2.4.2 Linear Quadratic Welfare Measure
I follow Benigno and Woodford (2012)[9] and Woodford (2003)[82] to formulate a linear-
quadratic (LQ) welfare loss function from the second order approximation to the utility function
of representative household, (2.1), and use it as an objective of macroeconomic stabilization policy.
As discussed in Walsh (2010)[80], Gali (2008)[39], and Demirel (2012)[30], LQ welfare loss function
has some merits. It not only guarantees an existence of local maximum under convexity assumption
and an appropriate set of parameters, but also it provides an advantage of easiness to assess various
types of alternative policy regimes measured in terms of social welfare criterion. Approximating to
(2.1) and the economy wide resource constraint gives a detail of the welfare criterion, W
Wt = −1
2
[
pi2t +
(
C2 + (1− σ)
Y
)
c2t + (1− Y )y2t +
(
ξĜ+ ξG2
Y
)
g2t + ϕl
2
t + ytat + (GξĜ)gt
]
(2.40)
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(2.40) is called ”naive” LQ welfare loss function according to Benigno and Woodford (2012)[9], since
the last term is linear, that prevents accurate calculation of economy wide welfare loss because the
purpose of LQ function is to capture overall level of variances of key macroeconomic variables.
Another reason why it is not the best criterion for the social welfare measure is that it also contains
non-policy choice variables, such as ct and lt, and these variables are not much helpful for policy
analysis. Substituting two more relations ct =
Y
C yt − (1ξĜ)GY gt and lt = yt − at, one can eliminate
those two non-policy variables from W. Therefore, rewriting (2.38) only in purely quadratic terms
of policy variables gives a clearer version of the loss function:
Wt = −1
2
[
pi2t + Θty
2
t + Θgg
2
t −Θy,gytgt + 2(1− ϕ)ytat
]
(2.41)
where Θy =
[(
C2+(1−σ)
Y
)
+ Y + ϕ− 1
]
, Θg =
[(
(1 + ξĜ)GC
)2 (
1+ξĜ+ξG2+φ
Y
)]
, and Θy,g =
[
2Y G
C2
(1 + ξĜ)
]
.
Note that Θg and Θy,g contain ξĜ with positive signs. If ξ goes up, Θg and Θy,g clearly increase
while Θy remains unchanged. This asymmetric changes of parameters influences the relative impor-
tance of policy variables in the welfare loss objective function. Relatively increased weights on g2t
and ytgt terms make the policy maker lean more into the government spending variable. This means
that, remembering that the increased value of ξ means the amplified penalty of the government
spending spread on the economy, the policy maker perceives that with the increase ξ the economy
will lose more welfare gains from government spending part. This results in an ineffectiveness of
fiscal policy with higher level of ξ, because that policy tool becomes less preferred.
2.4.3 Optimal Policy Problem
A Ramsey policy problem using LQ approximation is defined by a maximization of the
sequence of (2.40) subject to (2.35) and (2.39). The choice set is {pit, yt, gt}t≥0. rt is out of the
choice set because it is automatically determined sequentially by (2.38).
maxpit,yt,gtE0
∞∑
t=0
βtLt (2.42)
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where the formulated Lagrangian equation is given by
Lt =Wt + χ1,t (κ(λyŷt − λg ĝt) + βEtpit+1 − pit)
+ χ2,t
(
−C
Y
1
σ
(rt − Etpit+1) + Etŷt+1 − ηgEtĝt+1 + ηg,nEt∆gnt+1 + ηa(Etat+1 − at)− ŷt − ηg ĝt
)
(2.43)
and χ1,t and χ2,t are Lagrangian multipliers or shadow prices for NKPC and IS curve, respectively.
2.4.4 Case of Discretion
In the case of full discretion, policy maker encounters a separate policy objective each period,
and chooses variables independent of past or future policy regimes. The optimal policy problem
under discretion is then modified by
maxpit,yt,gt
[
Wt +Dw,t + χd1,t (κ(λyŷt − λg ĝt)− pit +D1,t) + χd2,t (−ŷt + ηg ĝt − ηaat +D2,t)
]
(2.44)
where χd1,t and χ
d
2,t are the discretion-specific shadow prices, and taking Dw,t, D1,t and D2,t as
given, where Dw,t =
∑∞
s=1Wt+s, D1,t = Et [βpit+1 − λaat], and
D2,t = Et
[−CY 1σpit+1 + ŷt+1 − ηg ĝt+1 + ηg,n∆gnt+1 + ηa(at+1 − at)]. First order conditions are de-
rived as following:
−pit − χd1,t = 0 (2.45)
−Θyyt −Θy,ggt + 2(1− ϕ)at + κλyχd1,t − χd2,t = 0 (2.46)
−Θggt −Θy,gyt − κλgχd1,t + ηgχd2,t = 0 (2.47)
From the equation (2.45), one can find that a policy inconsistency problem can be arisen. Above
equations are reduced to the one to express the Ramsey equilibrium level of pit in terms of yt, gt,
and at in this full discretion case:
pit =
(
1− 1
ηg
)−1
[(Θy,g + Θy)yt − (Θy,g + Θg)gt + 2(1− ϕ)at] (2.48)
According to (2.48), regardless of the past history of the policy regimes or future expectation, the
monetary policy maker will adopt the notion of information on the fiscal policy decisions as given
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and refresh its policy tools at each period. Moreover, since parameters of ηg, Θy,g and Θg contain
ξĜ, the level of ξ makes its own effect on the result of pit in this discretion case. The overall effect
of ξ is captured by the first two terms of (46),
(
1− 1ηg
)−1
[(Θy,g + Θy)yt − (Θy,g + Θg)gt]. Effect
of an additional increase in ξ on pit in (2.46) can be calculated by total derivation of pit with respect
to ξ. It is derived by
dpit
dξ
=
(
1− 1
ηg
)−1 [
(Θy,g + Θy)(2Ĝ
Y G
C2
)− (Θy,g + Θg)(2(1 + ξĜ)(1 + ξĜξG
2 + φ
Y
)
G
C
Ĝ+ ((1 + ξĜ)2(
Ĝ+G2
Y
))
]
The above equation shows the effect of ξ on the equilibrium inflation level, pit. If the first term inside
the second parenthesis is larger than the second term,
dpit
dξ
is positive, which can be interpreted
that the additional increase in ξ can positively affect on the inflation rate, and thus on the interest
rate through (2.38). Therefore, the level of ξ is a key to the change of interest rate in discretion
case.
2.4.5 Case of Commitment
Problem of (2.42) and (2.43) can be directly described as a full commitment case. The
solutions of the maximization problem can be calculated by the following first order conditions:
−pit − χ1,t + β−1χ1,t−1 = 0 (2.49)
−Θyyt −Θy,ggt + 2(1− ϕ)at + κλyχ1,t − χ2,t + β−1χ2,t−1 = 0 (2.50)
−Θggt −Θy, gyt − κλgχ1,t + ηgχ2,t + β−1ηgχ2,t−1 = 0 (2.51)
The above conditions can be reduced to one expression for the pit, in terms of current levels and
discounted past levels of output, public spending, and the stochastic process deviations:
pit =
1
κ(λy − λg)
[(
Θy,g
ηg
+ Θy
)
(yt − β−1yt−1)−
(
Θy
ηg
+ Θy,g
)
(gt − β−1gt−1) + 2(1− ϕ)(at − β−1at−1)
]
(2.52)
In the commitment case, unlike the discretion strategy, the effect of variables on pit is one time
lagged with discounting factor β. While policy makers in discretion case should not believe that
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his policy decision affects on future economic changes since the inflation is purely independent of
past or future period, the policy makers in commitment case should take into account the lagged
effect of variables. In addition, note that coefficients on the lagged values of yt and gt are slightly
different from the discretion case. While in discretion case coefficients are weighted by
(
1− 1ηg
)−1
,
which includes Ĝ and is used in IS relation, a commitment case variables are weighted by 1κ(λy−λg) ,
which also includes Ĝ but it is used in NKPC. Moreover, the effect of the level of ξ can be observed
as in the discretion case. Taking total derivative of pit with respect to ξ shows the similar result
with the discretion case, arguing the importance of ξ as a determinant of the level of rt, the policy
interest rate.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis: Commitment Case
In this section, I compute the numerical values of solution from the commitment case with
appropriate parameterization. I observe impulse responses of the equilibrium to a 1% positive
productivity shock and negative monetary policy shock, and compare derived theoretical moments
of the solutions of the model with the real friction to the one without the friction. Furthermore, I
test some candidates of Taylor rule based monetary policy with different weights on inflation and
output gap targeting stabilization under LQ welfare loss criteria. I compare those policy regimes
to find the monetary policy that is most favorable yielding less welfare loss to the economy.
2.5.1 Parameterization
In order to numerically compute the impulse responses of the objective function under op-
timal commitment stabilization policy to an exogenous stochastic process, I obtain the structural
parameters of the described model in the previous sections. Table 2.1 shows the benchmark values
of the parameters. First of all, to illustrate the macroeconomic properties of developing economies,
I adopt some of the parameters with moderate modification from papers such as Devereux et al.
(2006)[31] and Demirel (2010)[29], which consider characterized market imperfections designed for
those countries. I follow Demirel (2010)[29] to set up intra-temporal elasticity between private and
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public goods as 2, and I assume inverse elasticity of labor supply to be 1.2 following Devereux et al.
(2006)[31]. While the correct level of degree of price stickiness is still in debate between leading pa-
pers in the area of policy discussion in emerging market economies, it is assumed to be 0.73, which
is generally accepted in New Keynesian literature such as Sbordone (2002)[68] which estimates the
value of price stickiness under appropriate modeling. The paper also gives a reasonable parameter
value of the inverse of labor supply elasticity, which is assumed to be 1.2. Inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution between differentiated final goods is set to be 11, which makes the markup revenue
for each individual monopolistic competitive firm be 1.1. Steady state values of endogenous policy
variables such as C, Y , G, R, and Π are analytically calculated with an assumption of ξ, a key
parameter value that determines degree of severity of the institutional cost, that has never been
estimated in the related literature. I use Chinese data from 1960 to 2010 to estimate the steady
state ratio of government spending to total output to be 0.22, and then adjust the value of ξ such
that steady state value of G and Y fit the estimation. As a result, ξ is estimated by 1.1609, and
the rest of steady state values are listed on Table 2.1. ξ tells how the economy is affected by
the wasteful government spending. For example, ξ converging to zero means that the economy is
approaching to the level where less effect of the institutional cost exists in the economy, in relative
terms, by improving some exogenous factors such as tax system or political transparency. High
level of ξ gives larger effect of the adjustment cost on the economy, which means there will be worse
economic condition that amplifies the effect and thus the economy has a long way to go to the ideal
level of public expenditures. Two stochastic processes are defined following Demirel (2010)[29],
which sets up the autoregressive parameter and productivity shocks such that the model calibrates
the results of Adam and Billi (2008)[1] and the history of United States volatility of inflation. The
remains of the parameterization are monetary policy parameters, γpi and γy. They are set to be an
appropriate level such that the model has a unique local maximum, and modified in the following
sections to assess alternative policy regimes. Following Gali (2008)[39], the benchmark value of γpi
is varied from 1.5 to 5, and γy is varied from 0.125 to 0.3.
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2.5.2 Procyclity of Fiscal and Monetary Policy
To see how the higher level of the institutional cost associated with the public expenditure
leads to more procyclical fiscal and monetary policy, I simulate the Ramsey equilibrium solved in
subsection 4.5, and observe impulse responses to 1% positive productivity shock and 1% contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock. Benchmark monetary policy parameters are set to be 1.5 for γpi and
0.125 for γy. Table 2.2 shows the comparison of theoretical moments between absence in public ex-
penditure real friction (ξ = 0) and presence case (ξ = 1.1609). Correlation between output gap (ŷ)
and two policy variables (pi, r) determines the level of cyclicality of macroeconomic policy trend. If
the value of correlation between output gap and public spending gap is positive, then it means that
the fiscal policy tends to be procyclical, and an increase in the correlation indicates severer pro-
cyclical trend in fiscal policy. Similarly, negative correlation between output gap and interest rate
means procyclical monetary policy, and the larger value indicates higher level of procyclical mon-
etary policy trend. From Table 2.2, changes in both correlations validate the hypothesis that the
presence of higher level of imperfect infrastructural development deepens the level of procyclicality
of fiscal and monetary policy. Noticeably the increment of the level of procyclicality in monetary
policy is larger than the one in fiscal policy. This can be interpreted as a result that monetary
policy authority tries to compensate wasteful government spending by extremely sacrificing its in-
terest rate policy tool. Moreover, overall economic volatility increases in the presence of ξ, and the
social welfare loss therefore increases. This result confirms another hypothesis of the paper that the
presence of higher effect of the institutional cost associated with public expenditure leads to the
higher level of economic volatility. Additionally, correlation between ŷ and pi can be interpreted as
a approximation to the slope of NKPC, and the result clearly shows that the slope becomes steeper
in the presence of ξ. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show impulse responses to 1% positive productivity shock
and 1% contractionary monetary policy shock, respectively. In the positive supply shock, price is
forced to go down and output gap increases, while abnormal two kinds of macroeconomic policies
are well synchronized to promote the stabilization of the economy. In Figure 2.2, presence of the
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real friction case (straight line) gives more volatility in all four important endogenous variables.
This simulation work cannot entirely explain why the procyclical policy trend is happened in de-
veloping countries, but it successfully proves that the additional institutional cost leads to higher
level of procyclicality and economic volatility.
2.5.3 Alternative Monetary Policy Discussion
Since many central banks in developing areas are implementing various version of Taylor rule
type interest rate rule, it would be interesting to compare different monetary policy regimes and
observe key characteristics in the equilibrium under the presence of the real friction to find the
better regime that yields lower level of social welfare loss. To do this, I change monetary policy
parameter values γpi and γy in the standard Taylor rule (2.38) under the existence of ξ = 1.1609.
I follow Gali (2008)[39] in varying those values within the range that the unique local maximum
is guaranteed. The benchmark value of γpi equals 1.5, following Taylor (1993)[75], and γy is set to
be 0.125. First test is to compare the benchmark Taylor rule with aggressive inflation stabilization
targeting rule, with γpi = 5 while γy unchanged. Next I compare the benchmark Taylor rule with
the aggressive weight on output gap stabilization Taylor rule that has higher value in γy with 0.3.
The last test is to compare benchmark one with the forward looking inflation targeting rule which
advantage is well explained in Woodford (2003)[82]. This forward looking Taylor rule is defined by
rt = r + γpipit + γpi∗Etpit+1 + γyŷt + zt (2.53)
where γpi
∗ is a policy parameter for the future inflation rate gap.
Table 2.3 shows some important theoretical moments of two cases with different value in γpi. Ac-
cording to Table 2.3, the aggressive inflation rate targeting rule with γpi = 5 deepens procyclicality
of both fiscal and monetary policy. Moreover, overall economic volatility is also increased and it
results in the higher level of welfare loss. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show impulse responses of those two
models to the positive productivity shock and negative monetary policy shock. It is interesting to
see that the benchmark model has more procyclical fiscal and monetary policy in the response to
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the positive real shock while aggressive inflation rate targeting rule has higher level of procyclical
fiscal and monetary policy trend. With the higher level of inflation targeting parameter, the policy
authority is encouraged to pay more attention on the inflation rate fluctuations at the same rate of
infrastructural development, which means the same level of increased cost to use one unit of public
spending (public spending becomes more wasteful). In the presence of positive shock to the real
sector, this changed scheme is more efficient in terms of stabilizing economy, but in the presence of
nominal shock, the scheme is limited and cannot fully function as a efficient stabilizing tool.
Table 2.4 depicts some statistic differences between baseline monetary policy rule and the rule with
an aggressively targeted output gap. With higher value of γy, the economy shows severer level of
procyclicality as well as higher level of economic volatility. Variances of all four macroeconomic
variables are jumped up and the correlations between output gap and two policy variables are
also exacerbated. As a result, welfare loss jump almost twice, which means the economy bears
higher level of deadweight loss which is measured by economic fluctuations. Figure 2.5 and 2.6
show impulse responses to two different exogenous shocks. Similar to the previous test, aggressive
output gap targeting rule experiences higher level of procyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy in
response to the productivity shock while it bears less procyclicality in response to the monetary
shock. From the previous two tests, inappropriately determined aggressive targeting rule on a spe-
cific policy variable can harm the economy in terms of volatility, and the procyclicality could be
worsen with the wrongly estimated policy parameters.
The last test is comparing benchmark interest rate rule with the forward looking inflation targeting
rule, as shown in (2.53). This interest rate decision rule is actually not a pure forward looking policy
rule, because it combines targeting an expectation of future inflation rate gap and present value of
inflation rate gap. However, this combination would give an insight how the economy reacts to the
shocks in the imperfect environment where a policy maker has much better control on one of the
policy variables. Table 4 shows differences in theoretical moments between benchmark rule and
forward looking inflation gap targeting rule. First of all, procyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy
is reduced. Specifically the amount of reduction in procyclicality of monetary policy is significant.
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This result can be interpreted as a situation that the better information on the path of inflation
can gives a way to reduce the procyclical trend of the policy. On the other hand, overall variances
of the economy is also decreased significantly, and thus the economy experiences much less social
welfare loss. The weight on the policy parameter of future inflation rate maybe too strong, but
the result still clearly tells that the forward looking inflation targeting rule is optimal among all
candidates.
2.6 Conclusion
I build a closed economy new Keynesian model Calvo type staggered price setting. In addition
to the traditional modeling, real quadratic adjustment cost is invited, that captures an additional
institutional cost associated with public goods. From the model, that social cost leads to the sev-
erer procyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy. Moreover, it also exacerbates economic volatility
relative to the frictionless version of the model. It fails to clearly show the reason of procyclicality
of fiscal and monetary policy in developing economies, but it still validates that the newly added
institutional cost deepens the abnormal policy trend in the rapidly growing regions. The paper
also shows that forward looking inflation rate targeting rule improves economy in terms of reducing
economic volatility and it also reduces procyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy. The policy
rule is suboptimal among all candidates because a rule determined by the Ramsey policy is always
optimal, but the test still has an edge in providing some insights in practical way.
There are additional notable limitations in this paper. First, the model assumes that the fiscal au-
thority collects taxes only in lump sum fashion to finance its spending. But in reality, as mentioned
by Tanzi and Zee (2000)[74], most developing countries experience the trend that large portion of
their tax structure is consumption or income taxes which are known as distortionary. Therefore, it
must be worthwhile to look carefully at the change in the model if any kind of distortionary tax is
introduced. Second, since many developing or emerging market economies are heavily dependent of
international trade and foreign capital flows, opening up the international dimensions of the model
should be interesting and more than encouraging. While monetary policies of most developing
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countries are influenced by the exchange rate in some extent, introducing exchange rate pegging
option in the group of alternative policy candidates and comparing it with the closed economy
version Taylor rule maybe also interesting. As Gali and Monacelli (2008)[41] tries for the case of
monetary union in Europe, an special case of developing countries can be treated in open economy
version of model. Third, as Frankel (2010)[35] points out, besides the institutional cost and heavy
dependence on international trades, another characterized fact about developing countries can be
substantial in policy decision making such that the fact which they still suffer from political in-
stability or central bank independence problem. In many of those countries, central bank is under
pressure of fiscal or other political institutions and thus the central bank cannot optimally choose
its own policy regime independently. Related to this topic, inconsistency problem of discretion is
still common across the countries. The model of this paper ignores those realities and they should
be reconsidered. Another interesting possible future work is recently changing trend of the pro-
cyclity in developing economies. According to Frankel (2011)[36], during the last decade, 24 out
73 developing countries made a historic shift from procyclical trend to countercyclical tendency of
their policy regimes. This should be related with the previously mentioned limitation of the model
such as the international dimension of policy decision making, since the most of those countries
have experienced an opening of their financial markets or significant change in international capital
flows in the recent decade.
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Table 2.1: Baseline Parameter Values
Symbol Name Estimated Value
ϕ Reverse of Elasticity of Labour Supply 1.2
σ Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution in Private Consumption 2
φ Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substitution in Public Consumption 2
β Time Discount Factor 0.99
δ Intra-tempotal Elasticity of Substitution between Differentiated Goods 11
µ Markup Revenue 1.1
θ Degree of Price Stickiness 0.73
Y Steady State Value of Yt 1.4968
G Steady State Value of Gt 0.7485
C Steady State Value of Ct 0.7485
L Steady State Value of Lt 1.4968
ξ Degree of Severeness of Imperfectly Developed Infrastructure [0, 1.1609]
ρ Coefficient of AR(1) process 0.9
εa Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock 0.8125
γpi Policy Parameter for log of Inflation [1.5, 5]
γy Policy Parameter for log of Output Gap [0.125, 0.3]
R Policy Anchor Value of Interest Rate 1.0264
Π Steady State Value of Πt 1.0161
69
Table 2.2: Theoretical Moments: Without or with Real Frictions in Government Spending Differ-
ence: ξ = 0 versus ξ = 1.1609 (HP filter, lambda = 1600)
ξ = 0 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0756 0.1278
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.2533 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.3316 0.9963
Interest Rate (r) 0.5656 -0.8861
Welfare Loss = 2.5863 . .
ξ = 1.1609 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0730 0.1511
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.2701 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.3435 0.9966
Interest Rate (r) 0.5712 -0.9551
Welfare Loss = 2.68556 . .
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Table 2.3: Theoretical Moments: Standard (γpi = 1.5) versus Aggressive (γpi = 5) Inflation Stabi-
lization Strategy. (HP filter, lambda = 1600)
γpi = 1.5 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0730 0.1511
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.2701 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.3435 0.9966
Interest Rate (r) 0.5712 -0.9551
Welfare Loss = 2.68556 . .
γpi = 5 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0471 -0.0944
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.2850 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.3557 0.9982
Interest Rate (r) 0.6011 -0.9798
Welfare Loss = 2.88252 . .
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Table 2.4: Theoretical Moments: Standard (γy = 0.125) versus Aggressive (γy = 0.3) Output Gap
Stabilization Strategy. (HP filter, lambda = 1600)
γy = 0.125 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0730 0.1511
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.2701 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.3435 0.9966
Interest Rate (r) 0.5712 -0.9551
Welfare Loss = 2.68556 . .
γy = 0.3 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0162 -0.1913
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.3831 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.4808 0.9998
Interest Rate (r) 0.7776 -0.9993
Welfare Loss = 5.24278 . .
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Table 2.5: Theoretical Moments: With or without Forward Looking Inflation Gap Stabilization
Parameter: γ∗pi = 0 versus γ∗pi = 1 (HP filter, lambda = 1600)
γpi∗ = 0 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0730 0.1511
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.2701 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.3435 0.9966
Interest Rate (r) 0.5712 -0.9551
Welfare Loss = 2.68556 . .
γpi∗ = 1 STD. DEV. Corr(ŷ,.)
Inflation Gap (pi) 0.0749 -0.4881
Output Gap (ŷ) 0.0925 1
Public Spending Gap (ĝ) 0.1002 0.9764
Interest Rate (r) 0.3668 -0.8310
Welfare Loss = 0.261654 . .
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Productivity Shock: With (ξ = 1.1609) or without
(ξ = 0) Real Frictions in Government Spending
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Monetary Policy Shock: With (ξ = 1.1609) or without
(ξ = 0) Real Frictions in Government Spending
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Productivity Shock: Standard (γpi = 1.5) versus
Aggressive (γpi = 5) Inflation Gap Stabilization
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Monetary Policy Shock: Standard (γpi = 1.5) versus
Aggressive (γpi = 5) Inflation Gap Stabilization
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Productivity Shock: Standard (γy = 0.125) versus
Aggressive (γy = 0.3) Output Gap Stabilization
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Monetary Policy Shock: Standard (γy = 0.125) versus
Aggressive (γy = 0.3) Output Gap Stabilization
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Productivity Shock: With (γ∗pi=1) or without (γ∗pi = 0)
Forward Looking Inflation Gap Stabilization
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Figure 2.8: Impulse Response to 1% Positive Monetary Policy Shock: With (γ∗pi=1) or without
(γ∗pi = 0) Forward Looking Inflation Gap Stabilization
Chapter 3
Effect of Wage Support by Government on Economic Volatility and Optimal
Stabilization Policy
3.1 Introduction
A sudden stop is defined, by related notable studies such as Calvo and Reinhart (1999)[19],
as a sudden decrease in foreign capital inflows. Since a capital inflow is calculated by a sum of
current account deficit and foreign reserves, the sudden reversal of foreign capital flows damages
both an output and a financial vulnerability, and it also exacerbates an unemployment rate and
a relative price volatility. This phenomenon has been a main topic in the related literature since
many emerging market or developing countries have experienced the similar pattern of economic
shifts during economic crises in various times. A notable example of the phenomenon observed
in those regions would be Mexican financial crisis in 1994 or Asian and Latin American financial
crisis in 1998 and 1999. While significant academic achievement on the possible causality of the
historic economic turmoil has been done in the literature, there has been still an ongoing debate on
a policy implication of the aftermath of the economic crisis in devleoping countries. Braggion et al.
(2009)[10] is a milestone study for the monetary policy implication which is aimed to stabilize the
economic volatility after a sudden stop comes. Another important stabilization policy discussion
regarding the phenomenon is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004)[12], which considers an inflation
targeting as a possible remedy for the consequential event of the financial crisis. While these papers
efficiently argue that the main monetary policy tool has been made an enough effect on the business
cycles in some countries, an effect of a structural changes in real wages on the consequence of the
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sudden stops, or similar pattern of economic crisis has been a little ignored because of its minor role
as a macroeconomic policy tool. In fact, there are strong statistical motivations to be interested
in the role of a wage support by a government such as a increasing minimum wages in a specific
period with a specific regional conditions. First, there is an intriguing linkage between an inflation
volatility and a real minimum wage level, which suggests that an increasing minimum wage level
maybe helpful in stabilizing price volatility after sudden stops or similar crisis caused by a sudden
external changes. Figure 3.1 shows a different path of inflation volatility of two countries which
kept dramatically different minimum wage regimes. South Korea, which experienced a financial
crisis in 1998 and has consistently increased its real minimum wage level for the last 25 years, was
able to avoid a high volatile price changes after the crisis. On the other hand, Mexico, which had
the similar crisis during 1994, never increased its real minimum wage level for the same span of
period, and it experienced relatively high volatile inflation fluctuations after the crisis. While the
minimum wage controlling would not be the most favorable main fiscal policy tool to stabilize the
economic volatility during and after the economic crisis, it must be studied further to recognize to
what extent this wage controlling method can help the main macroeconomic stabilization policies
in the special situation of crisis. Second, there is an ongoing question of what should be the
optimal level of minimum wage to fully stabilize an inflation volatility after severe fluctuation of
macroeconomic variables is experienced. Figure 3.2 compares different level of real minimum wage
changes and their linkage to the macroeconomic variables. Chile has kept the lower growth rate of
the real minimum wage than South Korea for the last 25 years and the country was successful in
suppressing the price fluctuations after the sudden stops in 1999, but it failed to stabilize the higher
inflation volatility around the new financial crisis in 2008. International and domestic economic
environments should be different between those two different times, but it is still interesting to
wonder if there is any specific level of optimal minimum wage level to fully stabilize the volatility
of some key macroeconomic variables after the crisis. Third, if there is a specific link between
minimum wage control and price volatility, it is also worth to question if the relationship only
matters for emerging market or developing countries. Figure 3.3 tells that the possible effect of
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the minimum wage on the economic dynamics is limited to the developed economies, by showing
that US data has no seemingly correlated linkage between the special fiscal regime and the business
cycles. US never experienced any type of economic crisis similar to a sudden stop or the other
pattern of crisis caused by a sudden foreign shocks during the past 25 years, and the data never
shows any meaningful effect of the minimum wage levels on the economic dynamics during any
type of external crisis. It is still unknown and very difficult to sort out an independent effect
of the minimum wage on the business cycles because the regime has never been considered as a
main macroeconomic stabilization policy tool in those developing countries during the crisis, and
it only has been used for a supplemental purpose as a part of social security system. But it is
important to investigate the effect of the minimum wage on the inflation stabilization process after
the economy experiences a dramatic foreign demand changes such as a sudden stop, and to figure
out how much it is helpful to support the monetary policy to accomplish its major goal of price
and output stabilization in the uniquely characterized economic downturn.
To answer those questions, I build a Small Open Economy (SOE) Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model with New Keynesian fashion. In addition to assumptions of a price
rigidity and a monopolistically competitive nontradable sector, I add a partially supported wage
structure by a government. A government sets a fixed level of a portion of the wage level that
positively affects the labor income and finances it by a lump sum fashioned taxation. This simple
wage structure cannot fully capture a realistic model of the minimum wage, but it still successfully
illustrates the effect of the minimum wage on the overall wage level and the economy wide marginal
cost structure. In this structure, the fixed part of the wage directly changes the overall income of
the domestic households, but it does not affect the optimal labor demand and wage determined in
a production sector. Minimizing a distorting effect of the government operation on the economic
equilibrium, the model shows the effect of the changing government wage support on the economic
dynamics of macroeconomic variables in a Ramsey policy equilibrium. I build a linear-quadratic
(LQ) social welfare loss measurement and use it as an objective function of the Ramsey policy
problem. The LQ form of the welfare loss function has a merit in terms of tractability. As a result,
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I find that the increasing government wage support in the form of minimum wages can reduce
the economic volatility of key macroeconomic variables, by ameliorating the trade-off between
output gap and inflation stabilizations faced by a policy maker. With this reduced trade-off in
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) the economy can achieve the goal of stabilization more
successfully. The economic intuition behind this result is that, a permanent increase in a certain
portion of the labor income preserves higher level of real purchasing power of the domestic agents
and it gives them a more room to keep their original level of consumption and production even
if there comes a sudden, unexpected negative foreign demand shock. This positive preservation
effect overcomes a negative effect of the increasing lump sum taxation in this model, and thus
the overall stabilization effect of the economy is improved. This model lacks an ability to answer
the second question drawn in the previous paragraph, so that it cannot find the optimal level of
minimum wage to fully stabilize the economy since the minimum wage level is fixed and given in
the problem. It also fails to answer the question of what should be the main difference between
developed and developing countries if the same level of the government wage support program is
introduced. Those two questions should be sought in the future development of the paper.
One main contribution of the paper is that, it introduces a kind of wage manipulation by government
in DSGE literature and tries to find the optimal policy regime in that environment. Benassy
(1995)[6] brings the minimum wage discussion into the macroeconomics context and Gali (1996)[38]
briefly discusses the role of it in Real Business Cycle fashion, but there has not been an any other
notable works studying the role of government-lead wage structural changes in the consequences
of the foreign-originated crisis in developing countries. The importance of the minimum wage
has never been ignored in labor economics literature with microeconomic scope, but it is also
important in the context of business cycle and sudden stops literature. This paper shows that,
while the statistical background is remained as a weak part, the aggressive wage support program
by the government possibly reduces the macroeconomic volatility by a significant level.
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3.2 Literature Review
There has been a rich volume of literature on a sudden stop. Majority of the research has
been focused on the causality of the sudden foreign capital inflows decrease motivated by Mexican
crisis in 1994 and the financial crisis in Asia and Latin America in 1998 and 1999. The international
dimensions of the developing countries naturally became strong candidates for the main driver of
the macroeconomic collapse. While Cavallo and Frankel (2008)[20] focus on the negative effect
of an openness to trade on the severity of the sudden stop, Joyce and Nabar (2009)[44] look the
history of emerging markets from 1976 to 2002 to find out that the financial openness made those
countries more vulnerable to the sudden capital reversals. Similarly, Mendoza and Smith (2006)[54]
points out that financial friction such as collateral constraint in those countries could be a possible
trigger. Another potential reasons for the sudden stops are liability dollarization argued by Chue
and Cook (2008)[23], Calvo (2006)[17] and Calvo (2002)[15], fiscal institutional problem argued by
Calvo (2003)[16], and asymmetric information problem pointed out by Rothenberg and Warnock
(2011)[66].
The result of the sudden stop is characterized by sudden decrease in output, severe depreciation in
real exchange rate, and high volatile price fluctuations. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009)[47] tries to repli-
cate the observed movement of the macroeconomic variables by inviting several restrictions in their
growth model, such as labor sectoral reallocation or various types of intermediate goods production
process. Relative price volatility is studied by Calvo et al. (2006)[18], which empirically confirms
the relevance of sudden stops and price volatility.
Study on policy implications of the aftermath of the sudden stops has been relatively little consid-
ered in the literature, due to the difficulty of the empirical analysis on the identification of the effect
of macroeconomic policies on the consequences of the sudden stops. Several theoretical works on
a monetary policy after sudden stops are notable, such as Braggion et al. (2009)[10] which points
out that the increasing interest rate in South Korea during the crisis was logically appropriate by
showing the procyclical policy mitigated the distortions created by a binding collateral constraint,
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and thus it was a welfare improving. On the other hand, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004)[11]
suggests that the countercyclical time-contingent inflation targeting monetary policy is optimal in
the dimension of sudden stops where time inconsistency problem is relatively more significant.
Role of minimum wage on the business cycles are rarely studied in the recent New Keynesian lit-
erature, since the body of school mainly focuses on the role of interest rate controlling in which a
money non-neutrality is a strong feature as an economic environment. But in Real Business Cycle
(RBC) literature, the supplemental policy regime is considered a positive rather than negative sup-
porting tool for the economic dynamics. Cahuc and Michel (1996)[13] argues that setting minimum
wage above the steady state wage level of an unskilled labor would increase demands for a skilled
labor, giving the unskilled labor a motivation to improve its labor efficiency, and thus the economy
shifts to the trade-friendly labor market structure and it finally induces higher level of economic
growth. Flug and Galor (1986)[34] also points out that in the unique environment of developing
countries where the real wage of unskilled labor is sticky downwards, the effective minimum wage
control roles as a distortion that changes a composition between unskilled and skilled labor forces
and thus it affects the trade pattern in an open economy and economic dynamics.
In sum, the effect of the minimum wage on the economic dynamics in an environment where the
sudden stops come or the money neutrality assumption is broken has not been clearly investigated,
and there is a room for this paper to have a potential contribution to the related literature.
3.3 Model
To see the effect of an increase in minimum wages on business cycles in an open economy, I
build a small open economy DSGE model with nominal price rigidity in a nontradable sector. A
small open economy, called domestic country, is assumed to be enough small to be ignored by the
world economy, which is the other side of the model. Therefore, the domestic country is given world
price and output as an exogenous variables. The world economy ignores an economic activity of the
domestic country because it is too small to make any worldwide change. Each part of the economy
consists of three parts: Households, firms, and a government. A representative household consumes
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tradable and nontradable final goods and a firm uses a labor as an input. The nontradable sector
is monopolistically competitive, which gives an each firm in the sector a small price power at each
period. The tradable sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and the price is totally flexible.
The model includes a structure of binding minimum wage. The wage level is the same across
sectors, so that if the government sets the binding minimum wage which is manually determined
such as a parameter, it increases the overall wage level directly. By changing the binding minimum
wage level, the wage and price level of the economy are affected and the change finally makes a
different transmission process of foreign exogenous demand shocks to the domestic economy. I solve
Ramsey policy problem from the competitive equilibrium conditions, and find an optimal policy
values which are used to determine the effect of the binding minimum wage on the equilibrium of
the economy.
3.3.1 Households
There are two types of goods produced in each country: Tradable and nontradable goods.
Composite final goods are aggregated by Cobb-Douglass fashion:
Ct =
(CT,t)
γ(CN,t)
1−γ
γγ(1− γ)1−γ (3.1)
where Ct is a final goods consumption, CT,t is an amount of consumption for the tradable goods
and CN,t is an amount of consumption for the nontradable goods. In the similar way, an overall
price level (CPI) is defined by prices of tradable and nontradable goods.
Pt = (PT,t)
γ(PN,t)
1−γ (3.2)
where Pt is an overall price level, PT,t is a price level of tradable goods and PN,t is a price level of
nontradable goods. PT,t is directly linked to the world tradable goods price level and a nominal
exchange rate:
PT,t = P
∗
T,tEt (3.3)
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where P ∗T,t denotes the foreign (world) price level of tradable goods and Et stands for a nominal
exchange rate. Hereafter, any variable with asterisk mark is defined by a foreign variable. By
normalizing P ∗T,t by unity, the domestic price level of tradable goods is simply the same with the
level of nominal exchange rate.
The demand functions for tradable and nontradable goods are then calculated:
CT,t = γ
(
PT,t
Pt
)−1
Ct (3.4)
CN,t = (1− γ)
(
PN,t
Pt
)−1
Ct (3.5)
The foreign country’s composite consumption, price level, and the demand functions are similarly
defined and calculated with asterisk mark. The demand function for each differentiated nontradable
good is derived by
CN,t(j) =
(
PN,t(j)
PN,t
)−ε
CN,t
where j ∈ (0, 1) is an index for single firm in the nontradable sector, ε denotes a substitution of
elasticity between the differentiated goods in the sector. The domestic households are assumed
to access to both domestic and foreign currencies denominated nominal bonds, BH,t and BF,t,
respectively, with fixed returns of interest, Rt and R
∗
t , respectively. They are also assumed to
receive a wage by providing an inelastic labor from one of tradable and nontradable sectors, and
own firms in both tradable and nontradable sectors. Therefore, a budget constraint for the represent
household is given by
PtCt +BH,t + EtBF,t ≤ Rt−1BH,t−1 + EtR∗t−1BF,t−1 + (Wt · W¯ )(LT,t + LN,t)− Tt + ΓT,t +
∫ 1
0
ΓN,t(j)dj
(3.6)
where Wt is a nominal wage in both sectors sectors, W¯ is a fixed minimum wage supported by a
government, LT,t and LN,t are an amount of labor supplied to tradable and nontradable sectors,
respectively, Tt is a lump sum transfer from a government, and ΓT,t and
∫ 1
0 ΓN,t(j)dj are total
profits of tradable and nontradable firms. Note that, a consumer receives a total wage Wt · W¯ at
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each period t, which consists of two margins, Wt, paid by a firm, and W¯ , paid by a government.
This simple wage structure illustrates a reality that a strictly set minimum wage by government
increases overall wage level, while that forced part of the wage structure is partly subsidized by the
government spending. The government finances the total minimum wage spending W¯ (LT,t +LN,t)
by levying a lump sum tax Tt. According to the constraint, the baseline value of the minimum
wage is 1, which means that the minimum wage does not increase or decrease the wage level paid
to the consumers. If the minimum wage level is 1.1, the overall wage level is increased by 10%. If
the minimum wage level is set to be 0.9, the overall wage level is decreased by 10%. Therefore,
by controlling the minimum wage level, the government can directly change the overall wage level
finally paid to the domestic consumers. It is weird to see that the minimum wage is expressed by
a proportional value, but this type of modeling is designed for the tractability, and this does not
harm the original intuition of the role of the minimum wage on the wage structure and the effect
of it on the entire model of this paper. If a government understands the fact that the increasing
minimum wage directly affects the increasing overall wage level and wants to do it, the government
precisely determine the increasing amount of wage level and manually control it.
The utility function of the domestic households is defined by
U(Ct, LT,t, LN,t) = E0
∞∑
t=0
(
C1−σt
1− σ −
(LT,t + LN,t)
(1+φ)
1 + φ
)
(3.7)
where β is a time discounting factor, σ ≥ is an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in private
consumption, and φ ≥ 0 denotes a reverse elasticity of labor supply. The utility function of the
foreign agent is defined identically with asterisk mark to the endogenous variables. The budget
constraint of the foreign agent is defined by
P ∗t C
∗
t +B
∗
F,t ≤ R∗t−1B∗F,t−1 +W ∗t L∗t + T ∗t + Γ∗t (3.8)
Note that for the small open economy assumption, the foreign (world) economy ignores the domestic
financial market activity and thus it does not consume the domestic nominal bond holdings.
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The first order conditions of consumers’ problems are calculated as following:
(Wt · W¯ )
Pt
= (LT,t + LN,t)
φCσt (3.9)
1 = βRt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(Πt+1)
−1 (3.10)
1 = βR∗t
(Et+1
Et
)(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(Πt+1)
−1 (3.11)
1 = βR∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ (
Π∗t+1
)−1
(3.12)
where Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
and Π∗t =
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
. (3.9) is a real wage determination or labor supply equation,
(3.10) and (3.11) are an Euler equation for home country. (3.11) is affected by a foreign interest
rate, which is assumed to be exogenous and stochastic to be defined later. (3.12) is an Euler
equation for the foreign economy, and both foreign consumption and inflation rate are assumed
to be exogenous to the domestic economy. Therefore, (3.13) describes the relation between those
exogenous stochastic processes.
3.3.2 Firms
There are two types of firms in the domestic country: Tradable and nontradable firms. While
the nontradable sector is monopolistically competitive with differentiated goods produced, the trad-
able sector is supposed to be perfectly competitive.
Tradable Sector A single tradable sector firm produces goods by using labor with linear tech-
nology,
YT,t = AT,tNT,t (3.13)
where YT,t is a non-differentiated final tradable good, AT,t is a productivity shock which follows
the stochastic process,
logAT,t = ρT logAT,t−1 + µT,t (3.14)
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where 0 ≤ ρT < 1 and µT,t ∼ N(0, σ2T ), and NT,t is a labor demand for tradable goods production.
A single tradable sector firm faces a profit maximization problem,
MaxNT,t
∞∑
t=s
Λt,s (PT,tYT,t −WT,tNT,t) (3.15)
subject to (3.15), where Λt,s = β
t−s
(
Ct
Cs
)−σ (Pt
Ps
)−1
, a stochastic discount factor. The first order
condition is calculated by
Wt
PT,t
= AT,t (3.16)
Nontradable Sector A single nontradable sector firm faces the similar production technology
and the profit maximization problem. The production technology is linear:
YN,t(j) = AN,tNN,t(j) (3.17)
where YN,t(j) is a differentiated final nontradable good of firm j, AN,t is a generally influential
productivity shock which follows the stochastic process,
logAN,t = ρN logAN,t−1 + µN,t (3.18)
where 0 ≤ ρN < 1 and µN,t ∼ N(0, σ2N ), and NN,t is a labor demand for nontradable goods
production. A marginal cost for a typical nontradable sector j, MCN,t(j), is derived by
MCN,t(j) =
Wt
AN,t
(3.19)
A price rigidity assumption is invited in this sector, following Calvo (1983)[14] and Yun (1996)[84]
type staggered price setting. A randomly selected portion of producers (1 − θ) freshly sets a new
price level at each period, while θ of firms keep their old price level at the same level with the last
period. Therefore, θ captures a degree of price rigidity. Let PN,t(j) be a price set optimally by a
firm j at time t. With the staggered price setting described above, PN,t+k(j) = PN,t(j). Then, a
typical firm j’s problem is given by
Max
PN,t(j)
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
ΛkN,t{Y kN,t(j)
(
PN,t(j)−MCN,t+k(j)
)
}
]
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subject to the international demand constraints
Y kN,t(j) ≤
(
PN,t
PN,t+k
)−ε (
Y kN,t
)
(3.20)
MCN,t+k =
WN,t+k
AN,t+k
(3.21)
where ΛkN,t ≡ βk
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ (
Pt
Pt+l
)
and MCN,t+k denote a stochastic discounting factor and a
nominal marginal cost at period t+ k with respect to the staggered price setting PH,t, respectively.
Note that a firm specific index j can be dropped in this problem as well, because every single firm
uses the same price setting subject to the same marginal cost and the same resource constraint.
First order condition yields
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
[
ΛkN,tY
k
N,t
(
PN,t − ε
ε− 1MCN,t+k
)]
= 0 (3.22)
Note that in the perfect flexible price setting, θ = 0, above equation reproduces PN,t =
ε
ε−1MCt.
It can be rearranged with stationary variables,
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)kEt
[
CN,t+k
−σY kN,t
PN,t
PN,t+k
(
PN,t
PN,t−1
− ε
ε− 1
PN,t+k
PN,t−1
MCt+k
PN,t+k
)]
= 0 (3.23)
One can now define the new price index of domestically produced goods under the staggered price
setting,
PN,t =
[
θPN,t−11−ε + (1− θ)(PN,t)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (3.24)
↔ ΠN,t ≡ PN,t
PN,t−1
=
[
θ + (1− θ)
(
PN,t
PN,t−1
)1−ε] 11−ε
(3.25)
3.3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Remaining part of this section is describing market clearing conditions, undefined exogenous
processes, and defining competitive equilibrium. First of all, the nontradable goods market clearing
condition is given by
YN,t = (1− γ)
( Et
PN,t
)γ
Ct (3.26)
= AN,tNt (3.27)
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Domestic and foreign bonds markets are cleared every period,
BH,t = 0 (3.28)
BF,t +B
∗
F,t = 0 (3.29)
and both productions sectors has matched labor supply and demand at each term,
LT,t = NT,t (3.30)
LN,t = NN,t =
∫ 1
0
NN,t(j)dj (3.31)
Balance of payment constraint is calculated by
γCt =
( Et
PN,t
)(1−γ)
(R∗t−1BF,t−1 −BF,t + YT,t) (3.32)
Next, I specify two types of external shocks to the domestic economy, R∗t and C∗t . The foreign
price changes, the other exogenous variables to the domestic market, is automatically determined
by (3.14). The foreign interest rate shock is defined by
logR∗t = ρR logR
∗
t−1 + µR,t (3.33)
where 0 ≤ ρR < 1 and µR,t ∼ N(0, σ2R) and the foreign consumption (production) shock is defined
by
logC∗t = ρC logC
∗
t−1 + µC,t (3.34)
where 0 ≤ ρC < 1 and µC,t ∼ N(0, σ2C). The reduced form of competitive equilibrium is defined by a
set of endogenous variables, {Ct, LT,t, LN,t, NT,t, NN,t, YT,t, YN,t, BH,t, BF,t,MCN,t}∞t=0 with a set of
prices, {Et,Wt, Pt, PN,t, PN,t,ΠN,t, }∞t=0, and a set of exogenous variables, {AT,t, AN,t, R∗t , C∗t ,Π∗N,t}∞t=0,
which solves equations (3.9) to (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.16), (3.18), (3.19), (3.20), (3.22), (3.24) to
(3.32), (3.33) and (3.34).
3.4 Qualitative Analysis
In this section, I derive a log-linearized system of equations that characterizes the competitive
equilibrium, which is reduced to several important relations such as New Keynesian Phillips Curve
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(NKPC) or IS relation. To solve an optimal policy problem, I derive a linear-quadratic (LQ) welfare
loss function from the domestic household’s utility function and the other equations. Then I derive
first order conditions from the well defined Ramsey policy problem.
3.4.1 Log-linearized System of Equations
First of all, let us define a relative price of tradable goods price PT,t to the price of nontradable
goods, PN,t, by Qt ≡ PT,tPN,t . Then the CPI price index can be expressed by
Pt = Q
γ
t PN,t (3.35)
The total production of tradable and nontradable goods can be log-linearized by
yT,t = aT,t + nT,t (3.36)
yN,t = aN,t + nN,t (3.37)
where xt =
Xt−X
X for any arbitrary endogenous variable Xt, and X means a zero inflation steady
state value of Xt. The market clearing conditions of the nontradable and tradable sectors, (3.26)
and (3.32), are also log-linearized to find the relationship between two outputs in the domestic
country.
yT,t = −qt + yN,t (3.38)
where I use the market clearing conditions of home and foreign asset holdings and YT(R−1)BF + YT
approximates to unity. Next, the real marginal cost in the nontradable sector is expressed by
MCN,t
PN,t
=
Wt
PN,tAN,t
=
(
(NT,t +NN,t)
φCσt
W¯
)
Qγt
AN,t
(3.39)
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Combining (3.36), (3.37), (3.38), and (3.39), the log-linearized version of the real marginal cost in
the nontradable sector is calculated by
m̂cN,t ≡ mcN,t − pN,t − logµ
= φγnT,t + φ(1− γ)nN,t + σct + γqt − w¯ − aN,t
= φγyT,t + (φ(1− γ) + σ)yN,t + γ(1− σ)qN − w¯ − σγaT,t − (φ(1− γ) + 1)aN,t
= (φ+ σ) yN,t + γ(1− σ)(1− φ)qt − w¯ − σγaT,t − (φ(1− γ) + 1)aN,t (3.40)
where µ = εε−1 , w¯ = log W¯ , and I use an estimation
Nt
Nt+Nn
= γ. The price decision equation in the
nontradable sector (3.23) can be solve forward and log-linearized by
piN,t = κm̂cN,t + βEtpiN,t+1 (3.41)
where κ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ . Next equations explain natural rates of three endogenous variables which will
be helpful in deriving NKPC and IS relation with a ”gap” variable, which is defined by x̂t = xt−xnt ,
where xnt is a natural rate of xt. ”Natural rate” means an equilibrium variable in an economy where
no economic friction exists.
qnt = aT,t − aN,t (3.42)
ynN,t =
(
1 + γ(1− σ)
σ
)
qnt (3.43)
ynT,t = (1− γ)qnt (3.44)
The detailed derivations are provided in the appendix. By combining (3.41) with (3.40), (3.42),
and (3.43), the baseline NKPC is derived by
piN,t = κ (ΩyŷN,t + Ωq q̂t − w¯ − ΩtaT,t − ΩnaN,t) + βEtpiN,t+1 (3.45)
where Ωy = φ+σ, Ωq = γ(1−σ)(1−φ), Ωt = Ωy
(
1−γ(1−σ)
σ
)
−γ(1+φ), and Ωn = (φ(1−γ)+1)−γ−
Ωy(
1−γ(1−σ)
σ ). Note that as γ goes to zero, the equation replicates a closed economy version of the
NKPC. Also note that, w¯ diminishes the trade-off between nontradable inflation and output gap
stabilization as long as Ωy is positive value, and it also softens the trade-off between nontradable
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inflation and the relative price changes, q̂t, as long as Ωq is positive value. Therefore, if Ωy and Ωq
are positive, w¯ behaves an economic volatility ameliorating role and thus the trade-off faced by a
policy maker is also mitigated. The demand side of the economy can be summarized by so called
IS relation, which can be started by a log-linearization of the household’s Euler equations, (3.10)
and (3.11), combining with (3.12):
0 = log β + rt − σ(ct+1 − ct)− pit+1
= log β + r∗t + (1− σγ)(qt+1 − qt)− σ(yt+1 − yt)
= log β + σ(y∗t+1 − y∗t ) + pi∗t+1 + (1− σγ)(qt+1 − qt)− σ(yN,t+1 − yN,t)
= log β + rt − σ
(
1 +
γ(1 + σ)
1− σγ
)
(∆yN,t+1) +
σγ(1 + σ)
1− σγ (∆y
∗
t+1)− piN,t+1 +
σγ
1− σγpi
∗
t+1 (3.46)
where ∆xt+1 ≡ xt+1−xt. By combining with (3.42) and (3.43), the above equation can be expressed
with ”gap” variables:
0 = log β + rt − Ωyy(∆ŷN,t+1) + σγ(1 + σ)
1− σγ (∆y
∗
t+1)− piN,t+1 +
σγ
1− σγpi
∗
t+1 − Ωy∗(∆aT,t+1 −∆aN,t+1)
(3.47)
where Ωyy = σ
(
1 + γ(1+σ)1−σγ
)
, Ωy∗ = Ωyy
(
1−γ(1−σ)
σ
)
. Note that, as tradable sector weigh parameter
γ goes zero, the IS relation replicates a typical closed economy IS curve. Also note that, the output
gap in nontradable sector is positively affected by the interest rate, foreign demands, but it is
negatively affected by domestic inflation rate and combined negative productive shocks. The other
two important equations which consist of the log-linearized equilibrium conditions are a relation
between home and foreign output changes and a relation between tradable and nontradalbe output
gaps.
ŷN,t = y
∗
t +
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
q̂t −
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
(1− γ)(aT,t − aN,t) (3.48)
ŷT,t = (−q̂t + ŷN,t + 1− γ
σ
(aT,t − aN,t)) (3.49)
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3.4.2 Linear Quadratic Welfare Loss Function
Following Benigno and Woodford (2012)[9] and Woodford (2003)[82], I build a linear-quadratic
social welfare loss measurement. This LQ type welfare loss function has a merit in two dimensions.
First, by using LQ welfare loss function, it is convenient to find a guaranteed locally maximized
unique solution. Second, it is also convenient to use for comparing different types of policy tool
alternatives. The welfare loss function in this economy is derived by
W = −1
2
{pi2N,t + Σq q̂t2 + ΣnŷN,t2 + ΣtŷT,t2 + (1− γ)γŷN,tŷT,t +
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
ŷN,ty
n
N,t
+ (1− γ)ŷN,taN,t + γŷT,taT,t + 2γΣq q̂t(aN,t − aT,t) + γ
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
ΣnŷN,t(aN,t − aT,t)
+ γ
(
1− γ
σ
)
ΣtŷT,t(aN,t − aT,t)}+O(‖ ξ ‖3) + t.i.p.
(3.50)
where Σn = (1 − γ)((1 − γ) + 2), Σq =
(
1−γ(1−σ)
σ
)2
+ γ(1 − γ), Σt = γ(γ + 2), O(‖ ξ ‖3) denotes
terms that are of order higher than third, in the bound ‖ ξ ‖ on the magnitude of the relevant
shocks, and t.i.p. represents terms independent of policy variables. A detailed derivation is given
in the appendix. Note that every coefficient on each part of (3.50) is positive, and thus the social
welfare loss is increased by increasing variance or covariance of the policy variables.
3.4.3 Ramsey Policy Problem
A Ramsey policy problem is defined by a maximization of the welfare loss function, (3.50),
with respect to the policy variables {piN,t, q̂t, ŷN,t, ŷT,t, rt}, subject to the NKPC, (3.45), IS relation,
(3.47), and two other relations, (3.48) and (3.49). Lagrangian equation for the policy problem is
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given by
Lt = Σ∞t=0βt[W+ χ1,t [κ (ΩyŷN,t + Ωq q̂t − w¯ − ΩtaT,t − ΩnaN,t) + βEtpiN,t+1 − piN,t]
+ χ2,t
[
log β + rt − Ωyy(∆ŷN,t+1) + σγ(1 + σ)
1− σγ (∆y
∗
t+1)− piN,t+1 +
σγ
1− σγpi
∗
t+1 − Ωy∗(∆aT,t+1 −∆aN,t+1)
]
+ χ3,t
[
y∗t +
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
q̂t −
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
(1− γ)(aT,t − aN,t)− ŷN,t
]
+ χ4,t
[
(−q̂t + ŷN,t + 1− γ
σ
(aT,t − aN,t))− ŷT,t
]
]
(3.51)
where χ1,t, χ2,t, χ3,t and χ4,t are the shadow prices for NKPC, IS relation, the foreign-home outputs
relation, and tradable-nontradable outputs relation, respectively. The first order conditions of the
Ramsey policy problem is derived by
−piN,t − χ1,t + βχ1,t+1 − χ2,t = 0 (3.52)
ΣtŷT,t − γ(1− γ)
2
ŷN,t − γ
2
aT,t − (1− γ
σ
)Σt(aN,t − aT,t)− χ4,t = 0 (3.53)
−Σq q̂tγΣq(aN,t − aT,t) + κΩqχ1,t +
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
χ3,t − χ4,t = 0 (3.54)
χ2,t = 0 (3.55)
−ΣnŷN,t − (1− γ)γ
2
ŷT,t − 1
2
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
y∗t −
(1− γ)
2
aN,t −
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
Σn(aN,t − aT,t)
+ κΩy + σ
(
1 +
γ(1 + σ)
1− σγ
)
χ2,t − βσ
(
1 +
γ(1 + σ)
1− σγ
)
χ2,t+1 − χ3,t + χ4,5 = 0
(3.56)
(3.45), (3.47), (3.48), (3.49), and (3.52) to (3.56) consist of the complete system of equations of the
Ramsey policy problem.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I observe impulse responses of some important macroeconomic variables at
the competitive equilibrium to the previously defined exogenous shocks. The purpose of this work
is that, by changing the binding minimum wage in the model, one can clearly and numerically
observe how the transmission of the external shock is varied. In the model, the baseline value
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of the minimum wage is 1, which means that the minimum wage does not increase or decrease
the wage level paid to the consumers. If the minimum wage level is 1.1, the overall wage level is
increased by 10%. If the minimum wage level is set to be 0.9, the overall wage level is decreased by
10%. Therefore, by controlling the minimum wage level, the government can directly change the
overall wage level finally paid to the domestic consumers.
3.5.1 Parameterization
Table 3.1 shows the list of baseline parameter values. Time discounting factor is set to be 0.99
as normal in the literature, elasticity of labor supply and intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
composite consumption are set to be unity and two, respectively, by following Demirel (2010)[29].
I also follow the same paper to set the share of tradable goods in composite consumption to be
0.45. Price stickiness parameter θ is set to be 0.66. There are two types of domestic productivity
shocks, and they are separately defined. I follow Demirel (2010)[29] to define the specifications of
the both productivity shocks in different sectors. I follow [39] and Gali and Monacelli (2005)[40]
to define two international dimensions of shocks, foreign interest rate shocks and foreign demand
shocks.
3.5.2 Role of Minimum Wage on Business Cycles
Figure 3.4 shows the changes in standard deviations of the key variables as the value of w¯
changes from 0.5 to 1.5. The benchmark value of w¯ is set to be unity. If w¯ is 1.1, the wage is
increased by 10% by the minimum wage increment forced by the government. Figure 3.4 clearly
shows that, for all five variables, economic volatility is decreased by the increasing real wage,
supported by the minimum wage raises. CPI inflation rate and the output gap in tradable sector
show a relatively higher volatility which is reasonable since the observed result is gathered from
the exogenous foreign output (demand) shock, and thus the terms including tradable goods react
more sensitively. Figure 3.5 shows the impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to the 1%
foreign negative demand shock. These five graphs also support the argument that the increasing
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minimum wage can reduce the volatility of the economy when sudden decrease in foreign demand
for the domestic tradable goods. It is interesting to see that when minimum wage is increased by
50%, the relative price of tradable sector to the one of nontradable sector positively reacts to the
negative shock while the nontradable sector is decreased. CPI inflation still negatively reacts to
the shock, but the volatility is much reduced in the case of positive minimum wage increasing.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of change in real wages on the economic dynamics and optimal
policy decision making where a portion of the wage structure is forced to operated manually by a
government. This model structure is designed to illustrate the effect of a fixed level of minimum
wage on the overall wage level and the marginal cost that permanently change the reaction of the
economy to the unexpected external foreign demand changes. Increasing minimum wage reduces
the real marginal cost by amount of changes in the overall wage increment, and thus it ameliorates
the trade-off between output gap and inflation stabilization faced by a policy maker. This alleviated
trade-off problem can lower the level of volatilities in key macroeconomic variables in the Ramsey
policy equilibrium. Economic intuition of this simulation result is that, the increasing minimum
wage can preserve a certain (more) amount of real purchasing power of the domestic agents even
if the public support is governed by a lump sum taxation, and this increasing purchasing power
enables the domestic economy to persist with the original pattern of economic activities more
consistently.
There are several significant limitation in this paper. First, wage structure should be considered
more seriously. It must show the effect of the minimum wage on the overall wage level and the
marginal cost structure more clearly, and it also must explain more clearly about the role of the
minimum wage on the business cycles. Second, staggered wage assumption would be helpful to
explain the puzzled part of the paper. In many developing countries, a nominal wage rigidity
has been found as a major economic characteristics and this phenomenon could help the role of
minimum wage in a clearer view.
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Figure 3.1: Statistical Comparison between South Korea and Mexico during the Different Time of
Crisis
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Figure 3.2: Statistical Comparison between South Korea and Chile during the Different Time of
Crisis
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Figure 3.3: Statistical Comparison between South Korea and US
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Figure 3.4: Changes in Standard Deviations of Key Variables with respect to the Change in w¯
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses of Key Variables to Foreign Demand Shock
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Table 3.1: Baseline Parameter Values
Symbol Name Estimated Value
φ Reverse of Elasticity of Labor Supply 1
σ Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution in Private Consumption 2
γ Share of Tradable Goods in Composite Consumption 0.45
β Time Discounting Factor 0.99
θ Degree of Price Stickiness 0.66
ρT Autoregressive Parameter of Domestic Tradable Sector Productivity Shock 0.69
ρN Autoregressive Parameter of Domestic Nontradable Sector Productivity Shock 0.94
ρR Autoregressive Parameter of Foreign Interest Rate Shock 0.9
ρC Autoregressive Parameter of Foreign Demand Shock 0.86
σT Standard Deviation of Domestic Tradable Sector Shock 0.071
σN Standard Deviation of Domestic Nontradable Shock 0.039
σR Standard Deviation of Foreign Interest Rate Shock 0.007
σC Standard Deviation of Foreign Demand Shock 0.007
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Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix in Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of Linear-Quadratic Welfare Loss Function
In this appendix, I derive a second-order approximation to the representative home con-
sumer’s utility function, (1.1), which is used as an objective function in the Ramsey policy problem
in section 4. To begin with, I use the following Taylor series approximation rule in this entire
appendix:
Xt −X
X
' xt + 1
2
x2t +O(‖ ξ ‖3) (A.1)
It is also useful to know the following knowledge:
σ = −UCC
UC
C (A.2)
ϕ =
ULL
UL
L (A.3)
where UX ≡ ∂U(.)∂X and UXX ≡ ∂
2U(.)
∂X2
for any arbitrary variable X. The first term in (1.1) can be
second-order approximated by
C1−σt
1− σ '
C1−σ
1− σ + UCC(ct +
1
2
c2t ) +
1
2
UCCC
2c2t +O(‖ ξ ‖3)
=
C1−σ
1− σ + UCC(ct +
1
2
(1− σ)c2t ) +O(‖ ξ ‖3) (A.4)
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The second term in (1.1) is approximated by
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
' L
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ULL(lt +
1
2
l2t ) +
1
2
ULLL
2l2t +O(‖ ξ ‖3)
=
L1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ULL(lt +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)g2t ) +O(‖ ξ ‖3)
=
L1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− UCC(lt + 1
2
(1 + ϕ)l2t ) +O(‖ ξ ‖3) (A.5)
In the last step I use
UL
UC
= MPN = −Y N and Y = C. So far, the second-order approximated
utility function is rewritten by
UC − U
UCC
=
(
ct + lt +
1
2
(
(1− σ)c2t + (1 + ϕ)l2t
))
+O(‖ ξ ‖3) + t.i.p. (A.6)
Next, from the the risk sharing condition, (1.52), and the market clearing condtion, (1.56), one can
obtain the following relation:
ĉt = Ξyŷt − Ξbb̂F,t + Ξy∗y∗t (A.7)
where
Ξy =
(
ωc
ωc + ωc∗
+
σ
(1− α)
(
(1− α)ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
− α
))−1
Ξb =
BFΨB
(1− α)
(
(1− α)ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
− α
)(
ωc
ωc + ωc∗
+
σ
(1− α)
(
(1− α)ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
− α
))−1
Ξy∗ =
(
ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
+
σ
(1− α)
(
(1− α)ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
− α
))(
ωc
ωc + ωc∗
+
σ
(1− α)
(
(1− α)ωc∗
ωc + ωc∗
− α
))−1
Furthermore, Lt = Nt is also written in terms of variables included in NKPC and IS relation, and
approximated by,
n̂t = ŷt + kt (A.8)
where kt = log
∫ 1
0
(
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t
)−ε
dj. Combining (A.7) and (A.8) with (A.6) and applying two lemmas
in the appendix of [40] and the chapter 6 of [82], the welfare loss function is represented by,
W ≡ UC − U
UCC
=
1
2
[
kt + Ωyŷ
2 + Ωbb̂F,t
2 − 2Ωy,bŷtb̂F,t + 2Ωy,y∗ ŷty∗t − 2Ωb,y∗ b̂F,ty∗t
]
+O(‖ ξ ‖3) + t.i.p.
=
1
2
[ ε
κ
pi2H,t + Ωyŷ
2 + Ωbb̂F,t
2 − 2Ωy,bŷtb̂F,t + 2Ωy,y∗ ŷty∗t − 2Ωb,y∗ b̂F,ty∗t
]
+O(‖ ξ ‖3) + t.i.p.
(A.9)
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where
Ωy = (1− σ)Ξ2y + (1 + ϕ)
Ωb = (1− σ)Ξ2b
Ωy,b = 2(1− σ)ΞyΞb
Ωy,y∗ = 2(1− σ)ΞyΞy∗
Ωb,y∗ = 2(1− σ)Ξy∗Ξb
which corresponds to (1.65).
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Appendix B
Mathematical Appendix in Chapter 2
B.1 Efficient Level Equilibrium
In order to have natural rates of output and government spending as a log-linearized form,
one needs to solve a competitive equilibrium problem under complete market environment. A
social planner’s problem is given by the maximization of the utility function, (2.1), such that the
economy-wide budget constraint,
Ct +Gt = AtLt (B.1)
First order necessary conditions are calculated and log-linearized by
ϕlnt − at = −σcnt = −φgnt (B.2)
Note that the second equality comes from the efficient level equilibrium condition that marginal
utility of private consumption should be equal to marginal utility of public consumption. The
economy-wide budget constraint is also log-linearized by
at + l
n
t =
C
Y
cnt +
G
Y
gnt (B.3)
Combining (B.2) and (B.3) to remove lnt and c
n
t and express g
n
t in terms of at, the exogenous
variable, one can obtain the natural level of government spending given by
gnt =
[
1
Y
(
Cφ
σ
+G) +
φ
ϕ
]−1
(1 +
1
ϕ
)at (B.4)
which corresponds to (2.37).
To achieve a efficient level of output, ynt , setting (2.34) to be zero, which means that in the efficient
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level the real marginal cost should be zero since there is neither price rigidity nor imperfect com-
petition. And substituting (B.4) into the modified equation, one can express ynt in terms of at and
the other parameters.
ynt = (ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)−1
[
σ
G
C
gnt + (ϕ+ 1)a
n
t
]
(B.5)
which corresponds to (2.36).
B.2 Derivation of IS relation
In this part, I show the detailed calculation of deriving IS equation. Log-linearizing the
Euler equation (2.10) gives a log deviation version of relationship between consumption stream and
inflation changes:
−σct = (rt − pit+1)− σct+1 (B.6)
To replace ct and ct+1 with terms of yt and gt, one needs to log-linearize economy wide resource
constraint, Yt = Ct +Gt +
ξ
2(Gt −Gnt )2 and rewrite it with the expression of ct,
ct =
Y
C
yt +
G
C
(1 + ξĜ)gt (B.7)
Substituting (B.7) into (B.6) gives an expression for yt, gt, rt, and pit+1,
yt − G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)gt = − C
σY
(rt − pit+1) + yt+1 + G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)gt+1 (B.8)
The remaining part is to express (B.8) with ”gap” variables, which is defined by x̂t = xt − xnt for
any arbitrary variable x. Substituting definitions of ynt and g
n
t from (2.36) and (2.37) into (B.8)
provides an expression for ŷt and ĝt:
ŷt + (ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)−1
[
σ
G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)
]
gnt + (ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)−1(ϕ+ 1)at − G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)ĝt
− G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)(
1
Y
(
cφ
σ
+G) +
φ
ϕ
)−1(1 +
1
ϕ
)at
= − 1
σ
C
Y
(rt − pit+1) + ŷt+1 + (ϕ+ σY
C
)−1
[
σ
G
C
(1 + ξĜ)
]
ĝt+1 + (ϕ+ σ
Y
C
)−1(ϕ+ 1)at+1
− G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)ĝt+1 − G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)(
1
Y
(
Cφ
σ
+G) +
φ
ϕ
)−1(1 +
1
ϕ
)at+1
(B.9)
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Rewriting (B.9) provides new Keynesian IS equation with the government spending under frictions:
ŷt − G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)ĝt +
G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)ĝt+1
= − 1
σ
(rt − Etpit+1) + ŷt+1 + (ϕ+ σY
C
)−1
[
σ
G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)
]
(gnt+1 − gnt )
−
[
G
Y
(1 + ξĜ)(
1
Y
(
Cφ
σ
+G) +
φ
ϕ
)−1(1 +
1
ϕ
)− (ϕ+ σY
C
)−1(ϕ+ 1)
]
(at+1 − at)
(B.10)
which corresponds to (2.39) with following definitions of parameters.
B.3 Derivation of Linear-Quadratic Welfare Loss Function
In this part, I derive the second order approximation to the utility function of a representative
consumer to find the appropriate value of linear-quadratic welfare loss function, shown in (2.40)
and (2.41). To do this job, I use the following Taylor series expansion
Xt −X
X
' xt + 1
2
x2t +O(‖ εa ‖3) (B.11)
for any arbitrary endogenous variable Xt. First step is to get second order approximation to the
utility function, (2.1). It is useful to use the knowledge of (2.64) and the following three additional
convenient relations:
σ = −UCC
UC
C (B.12)
φ = −UGG
UG
G (B.13)
ϕ =
ULL
UL
L (B.14)
where UX ≡ ∂U(.)∂X and UXX ≡ ∂
2U(.)
∂X2
. After second order approximation, the first term in (2.1) can
be rewritten by
C1−σt
1− σ '
C1−σ
1− σ + UCC(ct +
1
2
c2t ) +
1
2
UCCC
2c2t +O(‖ εa ‖3)
=
C1−σ
1− σ + UCC(ct +
1
2
(1− σ)c2t ) +O(‖ εa ‖3) (B.15)
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The second term can be expressed in the similar way,
G1−φt
1− φ '
G1−φ
1− φ + UGG(gt +
1
2
g2t ) +
1
2
UGGG
2g2t +O(‖ εa ‖3)
=
G1−φ
1− φ + UGG(gt +
1
2
(1− φ)g2t ) +O(‖ εa ‖3)
=
G1−φ
1− φ + UC
G
C
(gt +
1
2
(1− φ)g2t ) +O(‖ εa ‖3) (B.16)
The last line in (B.16) is derived by the efficient level equilibrium condition UC = UG. The third
term for labor disutility is approximated by
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
' L
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ULL(lt +
1
2
l2t ) +
1
2
ULLL
2l2t +O(‖ εa ‖3)
=
L1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ULL(lt +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)g2t ) +O(‖ εa ‖3)
=
L1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ UC
L
C
(lt +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)l2t ) +O(‖ εa ‖3) (B.17)
To express the last line I use the condition that the marginal rate of substitution between private
consumption and labor should be equal to the marginal product of labor. Combining (B.15), (B.16),
and (B.17), the welfare measure at time t, Vt, is calculated by
Vt = UCC
[
ct +
G
C
gt − L
C
lt +
1
2
(1− σ)c2t +
1
2
(1− φ)g2t +
1
2
(1 + ϕ)l2t
]
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ εa ‖3) (B.18)
where t.i.p. denotes ”terms independent of policy.” To remove the linear terms in (B.18) and replace
lt with other variables, I obtain the log-linearized version of the second order approximations of
economy wide resource constraint, Yt = Ct +Gt +
ξ
2(Gt−Gnt )2 and the technology of the economy,
Yt = AtNt.
Y yt +
1
2
y2t =
1
2
pi2 + (1 + ξĜ)Ggt +
1
2
(1 + ξĜ+ ξG2)g2t + Cct +
1
2
C2c2t (B.19)
lt = yt +
1
2
y2t − ytat −
1
2
l2t (B.20)
Substituting (B.19) and (B.20) into (B.18) gives
Vt = UCC
[
−1
2
1
Y
(1 + ξĜ+ ξĜ2)g2t −
1
2
C2
Y
c2t −
G
Y
ξĜgt +
1
2
Y y2t −
1
2
y2t + ytat +
1
2
l2t +
1
2Y
(1− σ)c2t
+
1
2Y
(1− φ)g2t −
1
2
(1 + φ)l2t
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which is equivalent to
Vt = UCC
[
(
C2
Y
+
(1− σ)
Y
)c2t + (Y − 1)y2t + 2ytat + (−
(1 + ξGĜ)
Y
+
(1− σ)
Y
)g2t − ϕl2t
]
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ εa ‖3)
(B.21)
which corresponds to (2.40).
Appendix C
Mathematical Appendix in Chapter 3
C.1 Derivation of Natural Rates of qt, yN,t, yT,t
A ”natural” variable is defined by a variable at a state where no friction exists in the economy.
In the case of this paper, since the only economic friction is a price rigidity in the nontradable sector,
the fully flexible prices in both sectors are assumed to derive natural rates of log-linearized version of
key variables. First of all, in the frictionless economy, the marginal cost of firm j in the nontradable
sector equals to the price of a perfectly competitive sector:
MCN,t(j) = PN,t =
Wt
AN,t
The price of the tradable sector is the same in the previous sector:
PT,t =
Wt
AT,t
= Et
Equalizing the above two equations, a natural rate of the relative price of tradable goods to the
nontradable goods is derived by
Qnt =
PT,t
PN,t
=
AT,t
AN,t
(C.1)
Log-linearizing (C.1) gives a natural rate of qt:
qnt = aT,t − aN,t (C.2)
Next, combining (3.11) and (3.12), and substituting (C.1) into it, a natural rate of private con-
sumption has a relation with foreign consumption and the relative price:
Cnt = ξC
∗
t (Q
n
t )
1−γ
σ (C.3)
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Log-linearizing (C.3) gives
cnt = y
∗
t + (
1− γ
σ
)qnt (C.4)
Log-linearizing the nontradable goods market clearing condition (3.26) and combining it with (C.4)
gives a natural rate of yN,t:
ynN,t = γq
n
t + c
n
t
= γqnt +
(
1− γ
σ
)
qnt
=
(
1− γ(1− σ)
σ
)
qnt (C.5)
Latly, the market clearing condition (3.32) and substituting (3.29), (C.4), and (C.5) into it gives a
natural rate of yT,t:
ynT,t = (−qnt + yN,t)
= (1− γ)qnt (C.6)
C.2 Derivation of Linear-Quadratic Welfare Loss Fuction W
In this appendix, I derive a linear-quadratic welfare loss function by doing a second-order
approximation to the representative home consumer’s utility function and the other important
equations. This loss function is used as an objective function in the Ramsey policy problem in
section 4. To begin with, I use the following simple rule in this entire appendix:
Xt −X
X
' xt + 1
2
x2t +O(‖ ξ ‖3) (C.7)
It is also useful to know the following knowledge:
σ = −UCC
UC
C (C.8)
φ =
ULL
UL
L (C.9)
123
where UX ≡ ∂U(.)∂X and UXX ≡ ∂
2U(.)
∂X2
for any arbitrary variable X. The domestic consumer’s utility
function is approximated by
UC − U
UCC
=
(
ct + lN,t + lT,t +
1
2
(1− σ)c2t +
1
2
(1 + φ)(lN,t + lT,t)
2
)
(C.10)
To eliminate the first-order terms in (C.10), I use the following identities:
ct +
1
2
c2t = yN,t +
1
2
y2N,t − γ(qt +
1
2
q2t ) (C.11)
lt = (1− γ)yN,t + γyT,t − 1
2
l2t + (
γ
2
)y2T,t + (
1− γ
2
)y2N,t − (1− γ)yN,taN,t − γyT,taT,t (C.12)
Substituting (C.11) and (C.12) into (C.10) gives an identical equation with (3.50).
